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On June 23, 2011, the United States Supreme Court handed
down Stern v. Marshall,1 which has quickly become the hottest
topic in bankruptcy law in quite some time. This Article (1) briefly
describes the historical authority of bankruptcy courts; (2)
discusses the Supreme Court’s ruling and rationale in Stern; and
(3) discusses the ramifications of Stern through the lens of recent
case law discussing Stern, as well as other issues that have not yet
been addressed by the courts. As will be shown in this Article, the
majority’s pronouncements in Stern have led lower courts to
widely disparate conclusions about the breadth of the Stern
decision, and those pronouncements have also dealt a significant
blow to the foundational authority of bankruptcy courts, the full
effects of which have not yet come to fruition. At least for now, the
United States bankruptcy system is still running, despite an unclear
foundation for doing so.

1. 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
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I. BANKRUPTCY COURT AUTHORITY
A. Pre-Bankruptcy Code
In the beginning, there was debtors’ prison. As a vestige of
British practice (which itself derived from ancient and medieval
practices), as late as the early 19th Century in the United States,
debtors were often imprisoned for unpaid debts. However, because
the U.S. Constitution, enacted in 1789, provided for Congressional
authority to create laws on the subject of bankruptcies,2 Congress
made attempts at creating a federal bankruptcy law in response to
the increasing unpopularity of debtors’ prison.3 Prior to 1898,
Congress passed three Bankruptcy Acts: one in 1800 (set in motion
by a depression beginning in 1793), which was repealed three
years later; one in 1841 (set in motion by the Panic of 1837), which
was repealed two years later; and one in 1867 (set in motion by the
Panic of 1857), which was amended in 1874 and finally repealed in
1878.4 In the meantime, most states had insolvency laws, which
operated in the absence of federal bankruptcy law.5 After those
three failed attempts, Congress then enacted the Bankruptcy Act of
1898.6
Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, bankruptcy jurisdiction
was conferred on “courts of bankruptcy,” “court” was
defined to mean “the judge or referee of the court of
bankruptcy,” and “courts of bankruptcy” to “include” the
district judges. That Act gave the referees jurisdiction,
subject to review by a district judge, to perform all duties
conferred on “courts of bankruptcy” as distinguished from
those conferred on “judges,” which were to be performed
only by district judges. Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure
promulgated by the Supreme Court in 1973 redesignated
the referees as “bankruptcy judges.”7
Under the 1898 Act, “referees” were appointed by district
courts for six year terms; were removable for “incompetence,
2. See Article I, § 8 of the United States Constitution, which authorizes
Congress to establish “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout
the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
3. See DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION, A HISTORY OF
BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 25 (2001).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Vern Countryman, The Bankruptcy Judges: Jurisdiction by Neglect, 92
COM. L.J. 1, n. 1 (1987).
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misconduct, or neglect of duty”; were given fixed compensation
that “could be increased but not reduced by the Judicial
Conference of the United States,” which was payable from a fund
made up of fees and levies from bankruptcy estates; and were so
called because “a wide variety of cases under the old Act were
referred to them.”8
Courts of bankruptcy under the 1898 Act had summary
jurisdiction over three areas.9 First, they had “exclusive jurisdiction
over ‘matters of administration’” in the bankruptcy case (including
petitions; the bankruptcy res; the allowance, rejection, and
reconsideration of claims; the reduction of claims to money; the
“determination of preferences and priorities to be accorded to
claims presented for payment”; supervision of trustees; the
granting of discharges; and the confirmation of debt adjustment
plans).10 Second, they had jurisdiction to decide “controversies
over property in the actual or constructive possession of the
court.”11 Finally, “other actions by the trustee [were to] be brought
only in courts where the bankrupt could have brought [them] in the
absence of bankruptcy, unless by consent of the defendant[s].”12
B. The Bankruptcy Code
In 1978, the Bankruptcy Code came into being. The
Bankruptcy Code eliminated the referee system under the old Act
and established “in each judicial district, as an adjunct to the
district court for such district, a bankruptcy court which shall be a
court of record known as the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the district.”13 Judges of the newly formed bankruptcy courts were
“appointed to office for 14-year terms by the President, with the
advice and consent of the Senate” and were “subject to removal by
the ‘judicial council of the circuit’ on account of ‘incompetency,
8. Vern Countryman, Scrambling to Define Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: The
Chief Justice, the Judicial Conference, and the Legislative Process, 22 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 1, 2 (1985).
9. Id. at 3. This summary jurisdiction exists in contrast to a district court’s
plenary jurisdiction. Comment, Consent to Summary Jurisdiction, 34 FORDHAM
L. REV. 469 (1966).
10. Countryman, supra note 8, at 3.
11. Id.
12. Countryman, supra note 7, at 1–2; see also Countryman, supra note 8,
at 3. This third subset of consent jurisdiction was subsequently irreverently
referred to as “jurisdiction by ambush” when by Bankruptcy Act amendments in
1952, the absence of objection to summary jurisdiction was deemed consent.
Countryman, supra note 8, at 5–6.
13. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 53
(1982) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV)).
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misconduct, neglect of duty or physical or mental disability.’”14
Further, “the salaries of the bankruptcy judges are set by statute
and are subject to adjustment under the Federal Salary Act.”15
The 1978 Bankruptcy Code did not vest bankruptcy court
authority in Article III judges; however originally it was presumed
Article III judges would preside over bankruptcy courts.
The federal commission that produced the first draft of what
became the new Bankruptcy Code recommended that the
jurisdiction problems under the old Act be eliminated by
giving bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over “all controversies
that arise out of a bankruptcy case” without regard to
possession of property or the consent of the defendant.
Essentially, Congress adopted that recommendation,
although an effort by the House to elevate bankruptcy judges
to Article III status failed.16
The jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts under the 1978 Code was
“broader than that exercised under the former referee system,”
eliminated “the distinction between ‘summary’ and ‘plenary’
jurisdiction,” and instead granted bankruptcy courts “jurisdiction
over all ‘civil proceedings arising under title 11 . . . or arising in or
14. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 152, 153(a)–(b) (1976 ed., Supp. IV)).
15. Id. (citing 2 U.S.C. §§ 351–61 (1976 ed. and Supp. IV); 28 U.S.C. § 154
(1976 ed., Supp. IV)).
16. Countryman, supra note 7, at 3–4 (internal citations omitted). The
Supreme Court in Marathon also explained that:
It should be noted, however, that the House of Representatives
expressed substantial doubts respecting the constitutionality of the
provisions eventually included in the Act. The House Judiciary
Committee and its Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights
gave lengthy consideration to the constitutional issues surrounding the
conferral of broad powers upon the new bankruptcy courts. The
Committee, the Subcommittee, and the House as a whole initially
concluded that Art. III courts were constitutionally required for
bankruptcy adjudications. The Senate bankruptcy bill did not provide
for life tenure or a guaranteed salary, instead adopting the concept of a
bankruptcy court with similarly broad powers but as an “adjunct” to an
Art. III court. The bill that was finally enacted, denying bankruptcy
judges the tenure and compensation protections of Art. III, was the
result of a series of last-minute conferences and compromises between
the managers of both Houses.
458 U.S. at n.12 (citations omitted). See also Louis W. Levit and Richard J.
Mason, Where Do We Go From Here? Bankruptcy Administration PostMarathon, 87 COM. L.J. 353, 354 (1982) (“The House bill, however,
encountered substantial objection on policy grounds. To meet those objections,
the Senate produced bill S.2266 whereunder the status of the new court was
reduced to that of a non-tenured adjunct of the district court.”).
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related to cases under title 11.”17 Under that umbrella, bankruptcy
courts could hear claims based on state law as well as on federal
law.18 Under the 1978 Code, appeals from bankruptcy courts were
to be heard by three-bankruptcy-judge-panels (pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 160) or, if no panel had been appointed by the chief
circuit judge, by the district court (under 28 U.S.C. § 1334); the
court of appeals then had jurisdiction over appeals from the
appellate panels or the district court (under 28 U.S.C. § 1293);
however, there was also an option for direct appeal to the court of
appeals from a final order of a bankruptcy court under 11 U.S.C.
§ 1293(b).19
C. Marathon
Bankruptcy court authority came under attack in Northern
Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.20
(Marathon), decided by the Supreme Court on June 28, 1982, and
which resulted in a ruling that the broad grant of jurisdiction to
bankruptcy judges under the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 was
unconstitutional. Four justices of the Supreme Court concluded
that “the broad grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts
contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1976 ed. Supp. IV) is
unconstitutional” and explained that:
28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1976 ed. Supp. IV), as added by § 241(a)
of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, has impermissibly removed
most, if not all, of “the essential attributes of the judicial
power” from the Art. III district court, and has vested those
attributes in a non-Art. III adjunct. Such a grant of
jurisdiction cannot be sustained as an exercise of Congress’
power to create adjuncts to Art. III courts.21
In reaching that conclusion, the four justices reasoned that
bankruptcy courts were not authorized as Article I legislative
courts (specifically, they did not fall within any of the recognized
exceptions, namely the “public rights” exception, to required
Article III adjudication), nor were they authorized as adjuncts of
Article III courts because bankruptcy judges wield too much
17.
IV)).
18.
1982)).
19.
20.
21.

Marathon, 458 U.S. at 54 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (1976 ed., Supp.
Id. (citing 1 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY ¶ 3.01, at 3-47 to 3-48 (15th ed.
Id. at 55.
458 U.S. 50 (1982).
Id. at 87.
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power.22 Two additional justices, in a concurring opinion, reasoned
instead that only “so much of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 as
enables a [b]ankruptcy [c]ourt to entertain and decide” Northern’s
state law contract action was “violative of Article III of the United
States Constitution.”23 However, because these two justices
believed that grant of authority to bankruptcy courts under 28
U.S.C. § 1471 was not severable from the remaining grant of
authority to bankruptcy courts, they concurred in the judgment,
ruling the Bankruptcy Code’s grant of jurisdiction to bankruptcy
courts unconstitutional.
D. The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984
After Marathon, district courts adopted an interim “Emergency
Rule,” which allowed bankruptcy courts to continue to function
until an appropriate Congressional solution could be reached.24
When Congress legislatively responded to Marathon
(approximately two years later), it did so by the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 (“BAFJA”) in
which bankruptcy courts were not given Article III status; instead,
“Congress undertook in a new Section 157 of the Judicial Code to
specify what [bankruptcy courts] can do.”25 In fact, the Emergency
Rule “provided a basis for what was eventually adopted as 28
U.S.C. § 157.”26 28 U.S.C. § 1334 confers jurisdiction on district

22. Id. at 76, 86.
23. Id. at 91.
24. Countryman, supra note 7, at 6. Indeed, the Supreme Court had stayed
its judgment in Marathon for just over a mere three months in order to “afford
Congress an opportunity to reconstitute the bankruptcy courts or to adopt other
valid means of adjudication.” Levit & Mason, supra note 14, at 353. “The
emergency rule was initiated by the Judicial Conference of the United States in
September 1982 by a resolution requiring the Director of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts to promulgate a rule for use by the circuits in
the event that Congress failed to act by the end of the stay in Marathon.” Jeffrey
T. Ferriell, Core Proceedings in Bankruptcy Court, 56 UMKC L. REV. 47, n. 74
(1987) (citing Judicial Conference of the United States, Report of Proceedings
91 (Sept. 1982)).
25. Countryman, supra note 7, at 6.
26. One commentator has explained:
Like 28 U.S.C. § 157(a), the emergency rule provided for reference of
“[all] cases under Title 11 and all civil proceedings arising under Title
11 or arising in or related to cases under Title 11 . . . to the bankruptcy
judges of th[e] district.” The bankruptcy judge was empowered to enter
final orders and judgments in all proceedings other than those
designated as “related proceedings[, which were the province of the
district court].”
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courts (a) “originally and exclusively over bankruptcy cases” and
(b) “originally but not exclusively over all civil proceedings arising
under the Bankruptcy Code or ‘arising in or related to’ a
bankruptcy case.”27 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) allows district courts to
refer this jurisdiction to bankruptcy judges, and all district courts
have done so, with most if not all such referrals being
accomplished by a general order of reference from the district
court.28 28 U.S.C. § 157 provides for two types of bankruptcy
court adjudications: (1) decisions subject to appellate review by a
district court under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) and § 158(a)(1) (“core”
proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in a case under title
11) and (2) decisions subject to de novo review under 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(c)(1) (“non-core” proceedings otherwise related to a case
under title 11) in which the bankruptcy judge is to submit proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court.
Although the Bankruptcy Code has been amended a number of
times since 1984, bankruptcy court adjudicatory authority has not
been undermined since Marathon until Stern.
With this brief summary of the history of bankruptcy court
authority in mind, we now turn to Stern, which unearthed certain
lingering Marathon concerns by its ruling unconstitutional, as
violative of Article III of the Constitution, the exercise of
bankruptcy court authority over certain “core” proceedings, at least
in certain circumstances, under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C).
II. STERN V. MARSHALL
A. Majority Opinion
In a 5 to 4 split, the majority29 in Stern held, as applied to the
facts of that case, that 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) is unconstitutional.
Section 157(b)(2)(C) provides that:

Ferriell, supra note 24, at 57. The validity of the Emergency Rule was brought
into serious doubt, but under the circumstances, in that state of emergency,
everyone appeared to play along until Congress enacted BAFJA in 1984. Id. at 59.
27. Countryman, supra note 7, at 6.
28. Id.; Allen B. Kamp, Court Structure Under the Bankruptcy Code, 90
COM. L. J. 203, 208 (1985).
29. The majority consists of Roberts, writing for the Court, joined by Scalia
(who also wrote a concurring opinion), Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. Breyer
filed a dissenting opinion in which Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined.
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(b)(1) Bankruptcy judges may hear and determine all cases
under title 11 and all core proceedings arising under title
11, or arising in a case under title 11 . . .
(2) Core proceedings include, but are not limited to –
…
(C) counterclaims by the estate against persons filing
claims against the estate.30
Specifically, the majority held that the bankruptcy court lacked the
constitutional authority, even though it had the statutory authority,
to enter judgment on a state-law counterclaim/common law tort
claim, explaining: “Article III of the Constitution provides that the
judicial power of the United States may be vested only in courts
whose judges enjoy the protections set forth in that Article. We
conclude today that Congress, in one isolated respect, exceeded
that limitation in the Bankruptcy Act of 1984.”31 Thus, the
Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit and concluded that the
bankruptcy court’s exercise of its core jurisdiction pursuant to
§ 157(b)(2)(C) was unconstitutional because the “Bankruptcy
Court below lacked the constitutional authority to enter a final
judgment on a state law counterclaim that is not resolved in the
process of ruling on a creditor’s proof of claim.”32 The majority
also stated its rationale another way at the outset of the opinion:
“The Bankruptcy Court in this case exercised the judicial power of
the United States by entering final judgment on a common law tort
claim, even though the judges of such courts enjoy neither tenure
during good behavior nor salary protection.”33
This case arose out of longstanding litigation between Vickie
Lynn Marshall (also known as Anna Nicole Smith, now deceased)
and Pierce Marshall, the son of Vickie’s former husband, J.
Howard Marshall (also now deceased).34 After J. Howard’s death,
Vickie filed for bankruptcy, and Pierce filed a complaint seeking a
declaration and also filed a proof of claim in Vickie’s bankruptcy
proceeding for defamation based upon allegations that Vickie
induced her lawyers to tell the press that Pierce engaged in fraud in
controlling J. Howard’s assets. Vickie defended by asserting
“truth” and filed a counterclaim to the proof of claim alleging
Pierce’s tortious interference, asserting that Pierce fraudulently
induced J. Howard to sign a living trust that did not include Vickie
30. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) (2006).
31. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 2601.
34. The attached Appendix A is a chart detailing the procedural history of
the Stern case, which is described in more detail herein.
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even though J. Howard meant to give her half of his property.35
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C), the bankruptcy court36 found
Vickie’s counterclaim to be a “core proceeding,” and rendered
summary judgment against Pierce on his defamation claim and, in
a bench trial, awarded Vickie over $400 million in compensatory
damages and $25 million in punitive damages on her
counterclaim.37 Pierce appealed.
The district court38 disagreed with the bankruptcy court’s
determination that the counterclaim was a “core” proceeding and
believed that “it would be unconstitutional to hold that any and all
counterclaims are core.”39 The district court then held that the
counterclaim was not “core” and accordingly considered the
bankruptcy court’s ruling to be proposed rather than final (pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1)) and conducted an independent review of
the record.40 By that time, a Texas probate court (in which Vickie
had sued Pierce asserting tortious interference and in which Pierce
had counterclaimed for defamation) had conducted a jury trial on
the merits of the parties’ dispute and had entered judgment in
Pierce’s favor,41 but the district court declined to give it preclusive
effect and instead ruled in Vickie’s favor on the counterclaim and
awarded her compensatory and punitive damages of
$44,292,767.33.42 An appeal on a different ground43 was
previously taken, was reversed by the Ninth Circuit,44 and was
reversed again by the Supreme Court.45 On remand from the
Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit held that 28 U.S.C. § 157
mandated “a ‘two-step approach’ under which a bankruptcy judge
may issue a final judgment in a proceeding only if the matter both
meets Congress’s definition of a core proceeding and arises under
35. See infra Appendix A.
36. The Bankruptcy Court opinion may be found at 253 B.R. 550 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 2000).
37. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2601.
38. The District Court opinion may be found at 275 B.R. 5 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
39. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2602.
40. Id.
41. The Texas probate court’s ruling can be found at Marshall v. MacIntyre
(Estate of Marshall), prob. juris. noted, no. 276-815-402 (Harris Cnty., Tex.
Dec. 7, 2001).
42. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2602.
43. The first Supreme Court appeal focused on whether the probate
exception deprived the bankruptcy court of jurisdiction over Vickie’s
counterclaim.
44. The first Ninth Circuit opinion may be found at 392 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir.
2004), rev’d, 54 U.S. 293 (2006).
45. The first Supreme Court opinion may be found at 547 U.S. 293 (2006)
(holding that probate exception did not deprive the bankruptcy court of
jurisdiction over Vickie’s counterclaim).

2012]

BANKRUPTCY COURTS AFTER STERN

657

or arises in title 11.”46 Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that certain
proceedings listed as “core” may not be “core” if they do not also
arise “under or in” title 11. The Ninth Circuit found that Vickie’s
counterclaim was not “core” because the counterclaim was not so
closely related to Pierce’s “proof of claim that the resolution of the
counterclaim [was] necessary to resolve the allowance or
disallowance of the claim itself.”47 The result of the Ninth Circuit’s
holding that Vickie’s counterclaim was not core meant that the
bankruptcy court’s order was not “final.” Therefore, the Texas
state court’s judgment in favor of Pierce on the tortious
interference claim was, instead, the earliest final judgment on the
matter and was, therefore, entitled to preclusive effect.48
The Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Court considered
two main questions:
(1) Whether the Bankruptcy Court had the statutory authority
under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) to issue a final judgment on Vickie’s
counterclaim; and
(2) If so, whether conferring that authority on the Bankruptcy
Court is constitutional.49
The Court disposed of the first issue in a straightforward way.
The Court considered whether 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) conferred
statutory authority to the bankruptcy court to issue a final judgment
on Vickie’s counterclaim and concluded that it did.50 Based upon
the plain language of the statute, and declining to accept Pierce’s
more convoluted readings of the statutory language, the Court
reasoned that the “detailed list of core proceedings in § 157(b)(2)
provides courts with ready examples” of proceedings (including
counterclaims against persons filing claims against the estate) over
which bankruptcy courts may exercise “core” jurisdiction.51
The Court’s analysis of the second issue, however, undermines
the bankruptcy court’s statutory authority recognized in the Court’s
analysis of the first issue. As the Court explained: “Although we
46. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2602 (citing In re Marshall, 600 F.3d 1037, 1055
(9th Cir. 2010)).
47. Id. (citing Marshall, 600 F.3d at 1058).
48. Id. at 2602–03.
49. Id. at 2600.
50. Id. at 2608.
51. Id. at 2605. The Court further explained: “In past cases, we have
suggested that a proceeding’s ‘core’ status alone authorizes a bankruptcy judge,
as a statutory matter, to enter final judgment in the proceeding. See, e.g.,
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 50 (1989) (explaining that
Congress had designated certain actions as ‘core proceedings’ which bankruptcy
judges may adjudicate and in which they may issue final judgments…).” Id. at
2604.
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conclude that § 157(b)(2)(C) permits the Bankruptcy Court to enter
final judgment on Vickie’s counterclaim, Article III of the
Constitution does not.”52
The Court’s analysis is involved, but, distilled to its essence,
concludes that the Constitution requires that only Article III
courts—whose judges have life tenure and are protected against
salary reductions—decide “a suit . . . made of ‘the stuff of the
traditional actions at common law.’”53
The Court noted its prior decision in Marathon, in which the
Court “considered whether bankruptcy judges serving under the
Bankruptcy Act of 1978—appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate, but lacking the tenure and salary
guarantees of Article III—could ‘constitutionally be vested with
jurisdiction to decide [a] state-law contract claim’ against an entity
that was not otherwise part of the bankruptcy proceedings” and
held that such jurisdiction violated Article III of the Constitution.54
Similarly, in this case, the Court found the bankruptcy court’s
exercise of “core” jurisdiction over a state common law tort claim
unconstitutional.55
1. Categorical Bases for Allowing Bankruptcy Court to Resolve
State Common Law Claims are Inapplicable
In supporting its ruling, the majority considered the
applicability of various categorical bases for allowing a bankruptcy
court, as a non-Article III tribunal, to decide state common law
claims. The Court first went into great detail about the “public
rights” category of cases that can be constitutionally assigned by
Congress to Article I “legislative courts” for resolution and
determined that Vickie’s counterclaim did not fall into the
admittedly inconsistent various formulations of that category in the
Court’s prior cases.56
The Court cited Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co.57 for the proposition that “Congress cannot
withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its
nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or
admiralty” but that:
52. Id. at 2608.
53. Id. at 2609 (citing N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U.S. 50, 90 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment)).
54. Id. at 2609–10 (citing Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 52, 87 n.40)
(emphasis added).
55. Id. at 2611.
56. Id. at 2611–15.
57. 18 How. 272 (1856).
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At the same time there are matters, involving public rights,
which may be presented in such form that the judicial
power is capable of acting on them, and which are
susceptible of judicial determination, but which [C]ongress
may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts
of the United States, as it may deem proper.”58
The Court noted, however, that the “public rights” exception was
originally limited to instances in which the cases arise “between
the Government and persons subject to its authority in connection
with the performance of constitutional functions of the executive
or legislative departments,” as opposed to private rights,59 and is
limited by more recent jurisprudence to a case “in which the claim
at issue derives from a federal regulatory scheme, or in which
resolution of the claim by an expert government agency is
essential” to a regulatory objective.60 The Court cited the following
cases in that regard:
 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50–51 (1932) (allowing
administrative adjudicator to make specialized, narrow
factual determinations regarding particularized area of law,
with order enforceable only by district court).
 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 473
U.S. 568, 584 (1985) (statutory arbitration regarding
compensation did not violate Article III because “[a]ny
right to compensation . . . results from [the statute] and
does not depend on or replace a right to such compensation
under state law”).
 Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478
U.S. 833, 836 (1986) (CFTC jurisdiction over broker’s
counterclaim did not violate Article III because (1) claim
and counterclaim concerned a “single dispute;” (2) CFTC’s
assertion of authority was “narrow” and in “particularized
area”; (3) law in question was governed by limited federal
regulatory scheme; (4) parties elected to resolve differences
before CFTC; and (5) order only enforceable by order of
the district court).
 Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 54–55
(1989) (if statutory right is not “closely intertwined with a
federal regulatory program Congress has power to enact”
and “if that right neither belongs to nor exists against the

58. Id. at 2612.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 2613.
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Federal Government, then it must be adjudicated by an
Article III court”).
 United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313
(2011) (what makes a right public rather than private is that
the right is integrally related to particular federal
government action).
Based on the foregoing public rights exception precedent, the
majority first explained that the substance of Vickie’s state law
counterclaim “d[id] not flow from a federal statutory scheme.”61
The Court also determined that that Vickie’s counterclaim was not
“‘completely dependent upon’ adjudication of a claim created by
federal law, as in Schor.”62 The Court further explained that
“Pierce did not truly consent to the resolution of Vickie’s claim in
the bankruptcy court proceedings. He had nowhere else to go if he
wished to recover from Vickie’s estate”63 and that:
Pierce did not have another forum in which to pursue his
claim to recover from Vickie’s pre-bankruptcy assets,
rather than take his chances with whatever funds might
remain after the Title 11 proceedings. . . . as we recognized
in Granfinanciera, the notion of “consent” does not apply
in bankruptcy proceedings as it might in other contexts.64
The Court also decided that the substance of Vickie’s claim
was not limited to a particularized area of the law where an “expert
and inexpensive method” for resolving it would be available (as is
the case with certain issues given to administrative agencies
specially assigned thereto).65 Instead, the Court concluded that:
[T]his case involves the most prototypical exercise of
judicial power: the entry of a final, binding judgment by a
court with broad substantive jurisdiction, on a common law
cause of action, when the action neither derives from nor
depends upon any agency regulatory regime. If such an
exercise of judicial power may nonetheless be taken from
the Article III Judiciary simply by deeming it part of some
amorphous “public right,” then Article III would be
transformed from the guardian of individual liberty and
61. Id. at 2614.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2614–15 (citing Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 59
n.14 (1989) (noting that “[p]arallel reasoning to Schor is unavailable in the
context of bankruptcy proceedings, because creditors lack an alternative forum
to the bankruptcy court in which to pursue their claims.”)).
64. Id. at n.8.
65. Id. at 2615 (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1932)).

2012]

BANKRUPTCY COURTS AFTER STERN

661

separation of powers we have long recognized into mere
wishful thinking.66
2. Distinguishing Katchen and Langenkamp
Next, the Court considered Vickie’s argument that Marathon
and Granfinanciera could be distinguished on the basis that in
those cases, the defendants had not filed proofs of claim while
Pierce had. Because Pierce filed a claim in Vickie’s bankruptcy
case, she argued that the bankruptcy court had authority to
adjudicate her counterclaim.67 The Court said this distinction was
of no consequence because state law creates property interests, and
Pierce’s defamation claim did not affect the nature of Vickie’s
claim as being a tort claim at common law that attempts to bring
property into the bankruptcy estate.68
The Court distinguished Katchen v. Landy on the basis that, in
that case, the Court allowed a bankruptcy court to summarily
adjudicate a debtor’s preference claims against a creditor of the
estate where “it was not possible for the referee to rule on the
creditor’s proof of claim without first resolving the voidable
preference issue.”69 Put another way, “the same issue [arose] as
part of the process of allowance and disallowance of claims.”70
The Court limited its prior language in Katchen that “he who
invokes the aid of the bankruptcy court by offering a proof of
claim and demanding its allowance must abide the consequences
of that procedure” to circumstances in which the claim of the
debtor must be resolved in order to determine the allowability of
the creditor’s claim.71
The Court distinguished Langenkamp on the basis that, there, a
preference action was allowed to be heard where the allegedly
preferred creditor had filed a claim because “then ‘the ensuing
preference action by the trustee become[s] integral to the
restructuring of the debtor-creditor relationship.’”72 Because the
66. Id.
67. Id. at 2616 (citing to Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966);
Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42 (1990)).
68. Id.
69. Id. (citing Katchen, 382 U.S. at 329–30, 332–33, n.9, 334). The statute
at issue in Katchen was Bankruptcy Act, § 57(g)g, the predecessor to 11 U.S.C.
§ 502(d), which requires that amounts owed on account of avoidance actions be
paid to the estate before claims of entities from which property is recoverable
through avoidance will be allowed.
70. Id. (citing Katchen, 382 U.S. at 336).
71. Id. (citing Katchen, 382 U.S. at 333, n.9).
72. Id. at 2617 (citing Langenkamp, 498 U.S. at 44).
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bankruptcy court in Vickie’s case “was required to and did make
several factual and legal determinations that were not ‘disposed of
in passing on objections’ to Pierce’s proof of claim for
defamation,” such resolution was not integral as in Langenkamp.73
“There was never any reason to believe that the process of
adjudicating Pierce’s proof of claim would necessarily resolve
Vickie’s counterclaim.”74 As pointed out by the United States as
amicus curiae, the issue presented is whether the bankruptcy court
has authority to enter a final order on a compulsory counterclaim75
where adjudication of that counterclaim requires resolution of
issues that are not all implicated by the creditor’s claim against the
estate.76 The Court held that a bankruptcy court has no such
authority.77
The Court also distinguished Katchen and Langenkamp on the
basis that the actions brought by the trustees in those cases arose
under federal bankruptcy law, not state common law, like Vickie’s
counterclaim.78
3. Bankruptcy Courts Are Not Adjuncts of Article III Courts
The Court next considered Vickie’s argument that bankruptcy
courts are mere “adjuncts” of Article III Courts.79 The Court
concluded that “a court exercising such broad powers is no mere
adjunct of anyone.”80 The Court explained that after the 1984
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, “[t]he new bankruptcy
courts, like the old, do not ‘ma[k]e only specialized, narrowly
confined factual determinations regarding a particularized area of
law’ or engage in ‘statutorily channeled factfinding functions.’”81
Indeed, a bankruptcy court resolving a counterclaim pursuant to
§ 157(b)(2)(C) has the power to enter final judgment subject to
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. The majority noted that “[t]here was some overlap between Vickie’s
counterclaim and Pierce’s defamation claim that led the courts below to
conclude that the counterclaim was compulsory or at least in an ‘attenuated’
sense related to Pierce’s claim.” Id. (citations omitted). The dissent also notes
that the counterclaim was compulsory because it “arises out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim.” Id. at 2626
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 13(A); FED. R. BANKR. P. 7013).
76. Id. at 2617.
77. Id. at 2617–18.
78. Id. at 2618.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 2611.
81. Id. at 2618 (citing N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U.S. 50, 85 (1982)) (alteration in original).
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review only if a party chooses to appeal.82 Thus, as in Marathon,
the Court found that this authority is Article III authority being
exercised by a non-Article III court.83 “[A] bankruptcy court can
no more be deemed a mere ‘adjunct’ of the district court than a
district court can be deemed an ‘adjunct’ of the court of appeals.”84
That current bankruptcy judges are appointed by courts of appeals
rather than the President (which was a post-Marathon
Congressional change intended to aid in bankruptcy court
jurisdiction) is irrelevant.85
4. That the Majority Opinion Restricts a Bankruptcy Court’s
Ability to Enter Final Judgments on Certain State Law
Counterclaims may be Administratively Burdensome does not
Change the Result
The Court made short shrift of the fact that bankruptcy courts
not having core adjudicatory authority over such counterclaims
would be administratively burdensome. The Court explained that
“the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and
useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will
not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.”86 Moreover, not all
issues are currently consolidated before the bankruptcy courts—
certain other state law matters may already be heard by state
courts.87 Further, the district courts already have de novo review of
“related to” matters pursuant to § 157(c)(1), and the district courts
are permitted to withdraw the reference from the bankruptcy court
on the motion of a party or on its own.88 The Court did not believe
its holding would prevent bankruptcy courts from hearing state law
counterclaims; rather, it would prevent bankruptcy courts only
from entering final orders on such counterclaims.89
B. Justice Scalia’s Concurrence
Justice Scalia found “something . . . seriously amiss” with the
jurisprudence in this area in light of the numerous, varied, and
seemingly “random[]” reasons given by the majority for finding
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 2619.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983)).
Id. at 2619–20 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) & (2)).
Id. at 2620.
Id.
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§ 157(b)(2)(C) unconstitutional under Article III.90 Scalia
explained that, in his view, an Article III judge is required in “all
federal adjudications” unless there is some “firmly established
historical practice to the contrary,” though that subject was not
briefed by the parties.91
C. Dissent (Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, and Kagan)
The dissent agreed with the majority that § 157(b)(2)(C)
authorizes a bankruptcy court to adjudicate a compulsory
counterclaim to a proof of claim filed in a bankruptcy case but did
not agree with the majority that the statute is unconstitutional.
Instead, the minority explained that “the statute is consistent with
the Constitution’s delegation of the ‘judicial Power of the United
States’ to the Judicial Branch of Government,” and, consequently,
the statute is constitutional.92 In other words, this delegation of
authority to a non-Article III tribunal—the bankruptcy courts—is
no affront to Article III.
The dissent maintained that the majority emphasized the wrong
precedent. The dissent believed the majority’s focus on Murray’s
Lessee, as a source of the limits of Article III Judicial Power, relied
on dicta. Instead, the dissent thought the focus should be on the
public/private right distinction and noted that some public rights
are outside the cognizance of the Article III courts.93
The dissent also believed the majority underemphasized the
importance of Crowell v. Benson, in which the Court allowed a
grant of administrative adjudicative power to an agency regarding
questions of law and fact, with legal conclusions to be reviewed de
novo and fact-finding reviewed under a “supported by evidence in
the record” standard of review.94 Under that precedent, such a
delegation did not violate Article III, and a similar delegation to
bankruptcy courts also should not violate Article III. The
majority’s narrow reading of Crowell, which limited it to the
allowance of specialized tribunals for factual determinations in
particularized areas of law, would be an affront to other
Congressional delegations of authority, e.g., to the National Labor
Relations Board, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 2621 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 2620–21.
Id. at 2622 (dissenting opinion).
Id. at 2623.
Id.
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Surface Transportation Board, and the Department of Housing and
Urban Development.95
Rather than leaning on Marathon, the dissent would look
instead to Thomas and Schor, “with an eye to the practical effect
that the congressional action will have on the constitutionally
assigned role of the federal judiciary.”96 Accordingly, the dissent
would examine five factors in determining whether a non-Article
III tribunal has adjudicatory authority without running afoul of
Article III: (1) the origins and importance of the right to be
adjudicated; (2) the extent to which the non-Article III forum
exercises the range of jurisdiction and powers normally vested
only in Article III courts; (3) the extent to which the delegation
nonetheless reserves judicial power for exercise by Article III
courts; (4) the presence or absence of the parties’ consent to initial
adjudication before a non-Article III tribunal; and (5) the concerns
that drove Congress to depart from adjudication in an Article III
court.97 The dissent explained that the first factor weighed against
bankruptcy court adjudication because the claim is a tort claim, but
the fact that it is in a compulsory counterclaim undercuts the
negative aspect of that factor.98 The remaining factors weighed in
favor of bankruptcy court adjudication: (2) the tribunal has similar
protections as Article III judges that safeguard their protection
from improper political influence; (3) the district courts control
and supervise bankruptcy determinations (with respect to core
matters, findings of fact reviewed for clear error, conclusions of
law, de novo), and district courts can withdraw the bankruptcy
reference; (4) the parties consented to the bankruptcy court’s
jurisdiction (and Pierce could have brought his claim in state or
federal court since he argued it was nondischargeable); and (5) the
bankruptcy courts serve important legislative purposes—to “create
an efficient, effective federal bankruptcy system,” to deal with
“restructuring of debtor-creditor relations,” to interpret and apply
the uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies as set forth in
Article I § 8 of the Constitution, and to resolve claims (and
counterclaims) in bankruptcy cases in a consolidated forum.99
Therefore, “any intrusion on the Judicial Branch can only be
termed de minimis.”100

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Id. at 2625.
Id.
Id. at 2626.
Id. at 2626–29.
Id. at 2629.
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Finally, the dissent noted the staggering frequency with which
compulsory counterclaims based on state law claims arise in
bankruptcy and lamented the now “constitutionally required game
of jurisdictional ping-pong between courts,” which will “lead to
inefficiency, increased cost, delay, and needless additional
suffering among those faced with bankruptcy.”101
III. ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS
A. Are We Facing Marathon Problems Again?
That the Supreme Court has held unconstitutional part of the
statutory scheme relating to bankruptcy courts’ exercise of
adjudicatory authority in the realm of district courts’ bankruptcy
jurisdiction, which was enacted for the purpose of remedying
Marathon issues with respect to bankruptcy courts, may provide a
basis for future litigation challenging the jurisdictional foundation
of bankruptcy courts generally. Even though the majority
represented that it did not “think the removal of counterclaims such
as Vickie’s from core bankruptcy jurisdiction meaningfully
changes the division of labor in the current statute,”102
frighteningly, the majority also explained that: “With respect to
such ‘core’ matters, however, the bankruptcy courts under the
1984 Act exercise the same powers they wielded under the
Bankruptcy Act of 1978.”103 Might this analysis be used to argue
that the exercise of adjudicatory authority over “core” proceedings
by bankruptcy courts—some or all exercises of it—is an
unconstitutional encroachment into Article III Judicial Power, as it
was in Marathon? The Court proceeded to shake the foundation of
bankruptcy court authority further by stating: “Nor can the
bankruptcy courts under the 1984 Act be dismissed as mere
adjuncts of Article III courts, any more than could the bankruptcy
courts under the 1978 Act.”104 If bankruptcy courts are not
“adjuncts” under Article III notwithstanding their being designated
as “units” of the district courts by 28 U.S.C. § 151,105 then on what
authority do they operate?
101. Id. at 2630.
102. Id. at 2620.
103. Id. at 2610.
104. Id. at 2611.
105. 28 U.S.C. § 151 provides:
In each judicial district, the bankruptcy judges in regular active service
shall constitute a unit of the district court to be known as the
bankruptcy court for that district. Each bankruptcy judge, as a judicial
officer of the district court, may exercise the authority conferred under
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Bankruptcy courts must be authorized constitutionally—either
under Article I § 8, as a legislative tribunal, or under Article III, as
a court exercising judicial power, or possibly as an adjunct thereof.
But, the plurality in Marathon determined the bankruptcy courts
were not Article I courts because they did not fit within the defined
categories (territorial courts, courts martial, or “public rights”
courts) and expressly noted that Congress established the
bankruptcy courts as “adjuncts” and not as legislative courts.106
The Marathon plurality did note, however, that
[the] restructuring of debtor-creditor relations, which is at
the core of the federal bankruptcy power, must be
distinguished from the adjudication of state-created private
rights, such as the right to recover contract damages that is
at issue in this case. The former may well be a ‘public
right,’ but the latter is not.107
But, in Stern, the Court backed off of that statement in footnote 7
of the majority opinion. Because neither party before the Court
asked it to consider whether “the restructuring of debtor-creditor
relations is in fact a public right,” the Court did not decide that
issue.108 However, the Court did, with eerie implications, state that
it was taking the same view expressed in Granfinanciera: that “we
did not mean to ‘suggest that the restructuring of debtor-creditor
relations is in fact a public right.’”109 In sum, if bankruptcy courts
are not Article I courts per Marathon and the intentionally
unanswered question in Stern (because they are not territorial
courts or courts martial, and because the Court refused to even
suggest that bankruptcy courts are courts resolving “public
rights”)110 then, to have some constitutional foundation, they must
fall within Article III; however, we know bankruptcy judges are
not blessed with the constitutionally-required lifetime tenure, nonreducible salary, and Presidential appointment with Senate
confirmation that Article III judges have, so they cannot be Article

this chapter with respect to any action, suit, or proceeding and may
preside alone and hold a regular or special session of the court, except
as otherwise provided by law or by rule or order of the district court.
28 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
106. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 63
n.13 (1982); see also 28 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
107. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 71 (emphasis added).
108. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2614, n.7 (citing Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,
492 U.S. 33, 56, n.11 (1989)).
109. Id.
110. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 71.
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III Courts, and we know further from Stern that bankruptcy courts
are “no mere adjunct of anyone.”111 As the Stern Court explained:
“[S]uch judges should not be in the business of entering final
judgments in the first place” if they are “deemed a mere ‘adjunct’
of the district court.”112
Accordingly, it is unclear, at best, what the constitutional
authority for bankruptcy courts actually is, and Stern was careful
not to answer that question.113 Although the Court expressly
limited its holding to bankruptcy courts’ adjudicatory authority
under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) over state law counterclaims not
otherwise resolved in the claims resolution process, the Court’s
reasoning arguably undermines the soundness of the bankruptcy
court adjudicatory scheme as a whole.
Courts have, to date, been divided on how far Stern reaches.
On one end of the spectrum, a bankruptcy court has ruled it cannot
even hear, much less enter a final order on, fraudulent conveyance
actions because they are “quintessentially suits at common law”
and because there is no statutory mechanism for entering a report
and recommendation on an unconstitutional core proceeding.114 At
the other end, courts have ruled that Stern is to be construed
narrowly and that bankruptcy courts have core adjudicatory
authority over various kinds of actions under the “public rights”
exception,115 notwithstanding Stern’s admonition that “We noted
[in Granfinanciera] that we did not mean to ‘suggest that the
restructuring of debtor-creditor relations is in fact a public
right.’”116
111. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2611.
112. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2619.
113. The most constitutionally sound answer to this question this author can
muster is that bankruptcy courts must be Article I courts, authorized to
adjudicate bankruptcy cases based upon a modern formulation of the “public
rights” doctrine (in that bankruptcy cases are “integrally related to particular
Federal Government action,” Id. at 2598 (citing United States v. Jicarilla Apache
Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313 (2011))), with necessary reference to the Bankruptcy
Code, as the embodiment of the legislative bankruptcy power in Article I § 8, as
described above. But, this conclusion contradicts precedent and applicable
legislative statements. Thus, one is left to wonder what the constitutional basis
currently underlying bankruptcy court authority actually is.
114. See, e.g., Samson v. Blixseth (In re Blixseth), No. 09-60452-7, 2011 WL
3274042 (Bankr. D. Mont. Aug. 1, 2011).
115. See, e.g., In re Okwonna-Felix, No. 10-31663, 2011 WL 3421561
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2011); Sanders v. Muhs (In re Muhs), No. 09-10564,
2011 WL 3421546 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2011); Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v.
Ritz (In re Ritz), 459 B.R. 623 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011); In re Bigler, L.P., 458
B.R. 345 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011).
116. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2614 n.7 (citing Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 56).
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B. Cases Applying Stern117
1. On Counterclaims
In Turner v. First Community Credit Union (In re Turner), the
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas considered
whether it had jurisdiction over an adversary proceeding initiated
by a debtor against its bank regarding the freezing of its bank
account and denial of access to funds.118 The court determined that
the adversary proceeding was a core proceeding under the general
catchall: “a proceeding is core under section 157 if it invokes a
substantive right provided by title 11 or if it is a proceeding that,
by its nature, could arise only in the context of a bankruptcy
case.”119 The court raised the issue of whether Stern affected its
adjudicatory authority. The court explained that:
Because the Debtors’ suit against First Community is in
effect a counterclaim against this institution which filed
proofs of claim in the Debtors’ main case, at first blush it
would appear that Stern is on all fours and therefore that:
(1) this Court does not have the constitutional authority to
enter a final judgment in this dispute; and (2) this Court
must therefore submit proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law to the District Court, together with a
proposed judgment to be signed by that Article III Court.120
But the court distinguished Stern because (1) while state law issues
were at the heart of the counterclaim in Stern, in this case, the
alleged stay violations were based upon Bankruptcy Code § 362(a)
and (2) the Debtors’ requested relief was based upon an express
Bankruptcy Code provision: § 362(k).121 Alternatively, the court
determined that the stay violation dispute fell within the “public
rights” exception to Article III adjudicatory authority, noting that
“what makes a right ‘public’ rather than private is that the right is
integrally related to particular federal government action.”122 The
117. Please reference the accompanying case chart, attached as Appendix B,
which divides the cases discussed herein by subject matter and then by circuit,
and which also notes whether the holdings represent expansive or narrow
readings of Stern.
118. Turner v. First Cmty. Credit Union (In re Turner), 2011 WL 2708907,
at *1, *3 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. July 11, 2011).
119. Id. at *3 (quoting In re Southmark Corp., 163 F.3d 925, 930 (5th Cir.
1999)).
120. Id.
121. Id. at *4.
122. Id.
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court concluded that it may exercise authority over essential
bankruptcy matters under the “public rights” exception under the
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co. statement of
that exception, which maintains that “a right closely integrated into
a public regulatory scheme . . . may be resolved by a non-Article
III tribunal.”123
The Bankruptcy Code is a public scheme for restructuring
debtor-creditor relations, necessarily including “the
exercise of exclusive jurisdiction over all of the debtor’s
property, the equitable distribution of that property among
the debtor’s creditors, and the ultimate discharge that gives
the debtor a ‘fresh start’ by releasing him, her, or it from
further liability for old debts.”124
Thus, the court ruled that it could enter a final judgment in this
matter.125
In Jones v. Mandel (In re Mandel), the Bankruptcy Court for
the Eastern District of Texas considered issues relating to a breach
of contract proof of claim and corresponding adversary proceeding
relating to non-payment under a building contract.126 The court
determined, with respect to a counterclaim for restitution (based
upon improper use of exclusive, copyrighted plans for the subject
property being used on another property) asserted in the adversary
proceeding, that “[i]n light of the recent opinion by the Supreme
Court in Stern v. Marshall, the court does not have the
constitutional authority to decide this counterclaim—at least not in
the absence of the parties’ express consent.”127
In In re Olde Prairie Block Owner, LLC, a Northern District of
Illinois bankruptcy court determined it had the authority to enter a
final order on counterclaims asserted by the debtor either (1) where
the parties consented or (2) where the counterclaims were resolved
in the process of adjudicating claims.128 In reaching its conclusion,
the court explained that Stern held a bankruptcy court “lacks the
123. Id. (citing Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568,
593 (1985)).
124. Id. (citing Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 363–64 (2006);
N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 71 (1982)). But
see Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2614 n. 7 (2011) (“We noted [in
Granfinanciera] that we did not mean to ‘suggest that the restructuring of
debtor-creditor relations is in fact a public right.’”).
125. Id. at *5.
126. Jones v. Mandel (In re Mandel), 2011 WL 2728415, at *3 (Bankr. E.D.
Tex. July 12, 2011).
127. Id.
128. In re Olde Prairie Block Owner, LLC, 2011 WL 3792406, at *1 (Bankr.
N. D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2011).
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constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on a state law
counterclaim that is not resolved in the process of ruling on a
creditor’s proof of claim”129 and noted that the Supreme Court
specified that its holding is a “narrow” one and “does not change
all that much.”130 The court also explained that, under Stern, a
counterclaim that falls within the public rights exception, and thus
does not require the parties’ consent for final adjudication by the
bankruptcy court, is one that stems from the bankruptcy or would
be necessarily resolved in the claims allowance process. 131 Two of
the debtor’s counterclaims were “defensive” in nature and “had to
be resolved in order to rule on” proofs of claim that were filed.132
Three of the debtor’s counterclaims were not so resolvable because
they “each required legal and factual determinations different from
[the creditor’s] contract claim,” and, after Stern, though they are
“core” under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C), they must be treated as
non-core because final adjudication by a bankruptcy court over
them would be unconstitutional.133 However, because the parties
gave consent to the entry of final orders by the bankruptcy judge as
to all five counterclaims, the court retained that authority under 28
U.S.C. § 157(c)(2).134 The court concluded:
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Stern in no way altered the
system of final adjudication by consent embodied in
§ 157(c)(2). . . . The issue at hand, therefore, is not whether
the parties here could consent to a Bankruptcy Judge’s
jurisdiction, but whether they could consent to a
Bankruptcy Judge’s power to enter final judgment.135
In Siegel v. FDIC (In re Indymac Bankcorp. Inc.),136 the
District Court for the Central District of California refused to
withdraw the reference regarding a bankruptcy court’s adjudication
of non-core counterclaim dispute over ownership of $50 million in
tax refunds. The court acknowledged that the issue was non-core
and noted the similarities to Stern due to the counterclaim’s
posture and the fact that the counterclaim is a private right of
action, not public.137 However, the court refused to withdraw the
129. Id. at *3.
130. Id. at *5.
131. Id. at *4.
132. Id. at *5.
133. Id. at *6.
134. Id.
135. Id. at *7–8.
136. Siegel v. FDIC (In re Indymac Bankcorp. Inc.), 2011 WL 2883012, at
*1 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2011).
137. Id. at *6.
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reference because (1) the bankruptcy court had greater familiarity
with the facts, (2) the bankruptcy court held a unique vantage point
from the center of the overall bankruptcy proceeding, (3)
withdrawal would likely increase costs and lead to duplicative
efforts, and (4) withdrawal would invite new disputes, such as for
transfer of venue.138 Thus, the court determined it would be best to
decline to withdraw the reference and that it would instead review
the report and recommendation de novo.139
2. On State Law Issues
A Maine district court in United Systems Access Telecom, Inc.
v. Northern New England Telephone Operations, LLC, refused to
rule on Stern grounds with respect to the question of whether the
bankruptcy reference should be withdrawn by the district court
with respect to a dispute based largely upon FCC regulation under
§ 157(d), which requires withdrawal of the reference where
“consideration of both title 11 and other laws of the United States
regulating organizations or activities affecting interstate
commerce” are involved.140 The court determined that
telecommunications are subject to extensive FCC regulation under
federal statute, and even though certain state public utilities
commissions are delegated some authority, the dispute is “all
within the context of overall federal regulation.”141 As such, the
plaintiff’s alternative arguments that “state law rather than federal
law governs these disputes;[ therefore] . . . the Constitution
demands that the disputes be tried in this Article III court” and the
defendant’s arguments that “no interpretation of federal
telecommunication law is required to resolve the disputes, and that
under Stern, the public rights exception allows the state law issues
to be adjudicated in the Bankruptcy Court” did not form the basis
of the court’s opinion.142 The judge explained that he “need not
reach the issue whether Stern would alternatively require
withdrawal of the reference, and I [did] not decide the contours of
the public rights exception.”143
In NYU Hospitals Center v. HRH Construction LLC (In re
HRH Construction LLC), the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of New York adjudicated on a final basis a state breach of
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at *7.
Id.
456 B.R. 148 (D. Me. 2011).
Id. at 149.
Id.
Id.
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contract action, which had been removed to the district court and
then referred to the bankruptcy court, because “[p]ursuant to letters
filed on the docket in July of 2011, the parties consented to the
entry of th[e] decision [by the bankruptcy court] as a final
judgment.”144
The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York
in In re Salander O’Reilly Galleries denied a motion by an artconsignor-creditor (with a $9.5 million claim relating to a
Botticelli painting) seeking a lift of the stay to enforce a
contractual choice of law provision against a liquidation trustee of
an art gallery’s bankruptcy estate with respect to whether the
Botticelli painting was property of the debtor prior to the
bankruptcy under New Jersey law.145 The court reasoned that the
determination was an “essential and inseparable element of an
action under Bankruptcy Code § 544(a)” and was “inextricably
bound up with the resolution of the art claim and proof of claim it
filed” in the case.146 The court emphasized that
Stern is replete with language emphasizing that the ruling
should be limited to the unique circumstances of that case,
and the ruling does not remove from the bankruptcy court
its jurisdiction over matters directly related to the estate
that can be finally decided in connection with restructuring
debtor and creditor relations.147
Further, “[n]owhere in Marathon, Granfinanciera, or Stern does
the Supreme Court rule that the bankruptcy court may not rule with
respect to state law when determining a proof of claim in the
bankruptcy, or when deciding a matter directly and conclusively
related to the bankruptcy.”148 If the court were to grant the lift-stay
request, then the creditor’s claim would be adjudicated by someone
other than the bankruptcy court, which “may not be done—
allowance of claims is indisputably the realm of the bankruptcy
court.”149 Thus, the court determined that “[a]rbitration of whether
the Botticelli was property of the debtor or property of the estate
would improperly sever an element of the § 544 action” and that
other creditors are not bound by the choice of law clause, including
the bank (with a lien on the Botticelli) and the trustee (as assignee
144.
2011).
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

No. 09–23665(RDD), 2011 WL 3359576, at *6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2,
453 B.R. 106 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).
Id. at 115.
Id. at 115–16.
Id. at 117.
Id. at 118 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e)(1)).
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of that lien).150 Simply because state law may apply to the issue
does not remove it from the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.151
“Bankruptcy courts may apply state law as part of the resolution of
core proceedings.”152 The court also determined that it was not
required to send the matter to arbitration under the contractual
clause for myriad reasons.153
In Buffets Holdings, Inc. v. California Franchise Tax Board,154
the Delaware Bankruptcy Court considered summary judgment
motions presenting issues regarding the apportionment of debtors’
income that is taxable under California law and whether the
debtors qualified for a “Manufacturers’ Investment Credit,” also
under California law.155 The court explained that it “ha[d] core
jurisdiction over the motions for summary judgment, which
essentially involve[d] the allowance of the [Tax Board]’s
claims.”156 The court cited Stern for the proposition that “the
question [of bankruptcy court jurisdiction] is whether the action at
issue stems from the bankruptcy itself or would necessarily be
resolved in the claims allowance process” and cited the Stern
dissent for the proposition that “when the individual files a claim
against the estate, that individual has ‘triggered the process of
allowance and disallowance of claims, thereby subjecting himself
to the bankruptcy court’s equitable power.’”157
In In re The Salem Baptist Church of Jenkintown, a
Pennsylvania bankruptcy court explained in a footnote that
[a]lthough the precise implications of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Stern on the related-to jurisdiction of
bankruptcy courts remain to be determined, the Supreme
Court’s holding that bankruptcy courts may not decide “a
common law cause of action, when the action neither
derives from nor depends on any agency regulatory
regime” . . . suggests that, consistent with this Court’s
decision herein, this Court would lack jurisdiction to hear
the Debtor’s claims against [the defendants].158

150. Id. at 120.
151. Id. (citing Stern and Butner v. U.S., 440 U.S. 48 (1979)).
152. Id. at 123.
153. Id. at 127–29.
154. 455 B.R. 94 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011).
155. Id. at 96.
156. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 505(a)(1); 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(1)(B) & 1334).
157. Id. (citing Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2618, 2629 (2011)
(internal citations omitted)).
158. 455 B.R. 857, 863 n.6 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2011).
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In this case, the court granted motions to dismiss actions relating to
insurance coverage of certain claims and the issue of whether
insurance proceeds were property of the estate. Thus, the court
believed that Stern extends to “common law causes of action”
whether or not in a counterclaim posture and that Stern’s ruling
was jurisdictional.
In Barnhart v. Demarco (In re Demarco), a Pennsylvania
bankruptcy court held that an adversary proceeding, in which state
and federal law claims against the debtor and certain non-debtors
were asserted, could have no possible effect on the debtor’s estate
and, thus, that the court lacked related-to jurisdiction over the
adversary proceeding where the chapter 7 trustee in the debtor’s
case entered a report of no distribution stating that there was no
properly available over and above exempted property and
requesting discharge of the debtor.159 The court also noted that, “to
the extent that a plaintiff has joined its § 523 action with claims
against third-party, nondebtor entities, it is doubtful that a
bankruptcy court would, in a no-asset, chapter 7 case, retain
jurisdiction over the claims against nondebtor entities.” 160 The
court bolstered that conclusion by noting that:
Although the precise implications of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Stern on the related-to jurisdiction of
bankruptcy courts remain to be determined, the Supreme
Court’s holding that bankruptcy courts may not decide “a
common law cause of action, when the action neither
derives from nor depends on any agency regulatory
regime” suggests that, consistent with this Court’s decision
herein, this Court would lack jurisdiction to hear the
Plaintiff’s claims against nondebtor entities.161
In Fed. Ins. Co. v. DBSI, Inc. (In re DBSI, Inc.), the Delaware
Bankruptcy Court considered a motion for summary judgment on
the issue of whether the debtor’s director and officer (D&O)
insurance policy covers the defense costs of certain D&Os sued
based upon certain actions (including RICO and avoidance actions)
where the actions were filed after the D&O policy coverage
period.162 The court determined that the movants were entitled to
the coverage of defense costs at 100% where the claim at issue

159. 454 B.R. 343, 344, 346 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2011).
160. Id. at 348.
161. Id. at n.2 (quoting Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2599).
162. No. 08–12687(PJW), 2011 WL 3022177, at *1–2 (Bankr. D. Del. July
22, 2011).

676

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

involved a covered matter and a non-covered matter.163 However,
the court refused to “enter[] an order at this time because [it was]
concerned that this Court’s jurisdiction may be in question in light
of the Supreme Court decision in Stern v. Marshall. Before
proceeding further with this matter, [the court invited] the parties
to file written submissions on whether Stern v. Marshall permit[ted
the judge] to issue an order.”164
A West Virginia district court in Cline v. Quicken Loans165
determined that it had “related-to” jurisdiction over a civil action
asserting myriad state law causes of action, which was removed to
that court from the West Virginia state court, even though a related
proof of claim was also filed, and explained that “the proof of
claim does not transform the State Court Action filed by Plaintiffs
into a core proceeding.”166 The court noted that the plaintiffs had
filed a supplemental briefing on Stern with the court on the issue of
core adjudicatory authority, but did not further discuss Stern. The
court determined that mandatory abstention applied and that
comity and judicial economy did not weigh in favor of retaining
the action in federal, as opposed to state, court.167
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Sigillito v. Hollander (In
re Hollander)168 remanded a case for the bankruptcy court to
decide whether, under Louisiana law, the debtor’s false
representations constituted fraud and further explained that it
would “leave it to the district court below to determine in the first
instance whether Stern has applicability to further proceedings in
this matter.”169
Before deciding a motion for partial summary judgment filed
by a secured creditor as to the validity of its lien, the Louisiana
Bankruptcy Court in South Louisiana Ethanol, LLC v. Whitney
National Bank (In re South. Louisiana Ethanol, LLC) provided the
following caveat: “To the extent this Court does not have subject
matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Stern v. Marshall,
this Opinion will be considered a Report and Recommendation to
the U.S. District Court.” 170
In Rogers v. The CIT Group/Equipment Financing, Inc. (In re
B.C. Rogers Poultry, Inc.),171 a Mississippi bankruptcy court
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at *5.
Id. at *6.
No. 5:11CV63, 2011 WL 2633085 (N.D.W. Va. July 5, 2011).
Id. at *5.
Id. at *7.
2011 WL 3629479 (5th Cir. Aug. 16, 2011).
Id. at *4 n.1.
438 Fed.Appx. 274, n. 1 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2011).
455 B.R. 524 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2011).
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determined it could enter a final order on various Mississippi state
law contract and tort claims of a debtor in an adversary proceeding.
The court explained that the proceeding was core, notwithstanding
Stern, because “[t]he implications of the Stern decision, including
the extent to which it curtails bankruptcy court jurisdiction, remain
to be determined by the Fifth Circuit,” and the court’s ruling was
in accord with prior Fifth Circuit precedent.172
In Christian v. Soo Bin Kim (In re Soo Bin Kim), a Western
District of Texas bankruptcy court denied a motion seeking
dismissal of a complaint requesting a declaration of nondischargeability of a debt, liquidation of that debt, and a monetary
judgment against the debtor, which argued that the judgment
sought fell within the “probate exception” to bankruptcy courts’
subject matter jurisdiction.173 The court responded to a defendant’s
argument that, under Stern, the bankruptcy court “cannot hear any
of this matter because it touches on probate issues” by explaining
that “the defendant overreads that case and its application to this
proceeding” and instead followed binding Fifth Circuit precedent
on the probate issue implicated.174 The court refused to dismiss the
complaint notwithstanding the fact that “[i]n resolving the
bankruptcy question posed, the court may necessarily be called
upon to make findings of fact and conclusions of law that might
have some preclusive effect in a later state court action.”175
However, the court determined it would abstain from “liquidation”
of the claim or involving “disposition of assets of the probate
estate” in favor of the probate court.176
In In re Crescent Resources, LLC, the Bankruptcy Court for the
Western District of Texas determined that Stern did not apply to
the matter before it: a motion to compel turnover of documents, the
determination of which depended upon whether certain documents
were subject to a joint privilege, who can claim such privilege, and
whether the files could be used against certain parties.177 The court
determined that the matter was a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(b)(2)(A), (E), and (H) and expressed that it “[wa]s of the
opinion, at th[at] point, that Stern . . . should be applied narrowly.
The facts and issues in Stern do not relate to matters under
consideration of the Court. The Court therefore [found] that Stern
does not apply to this case.”178
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at 548, n.31.
2011 WL 2708985, at *1 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. July 11, 2011).
Id. at *2 n.2.
Id. at *2.
Id.
457 B.R. 506, 509 n.2 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2011).
Id. at 510, n.2.
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The Chief Judge of the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern
District of Texas denied a motion to dismiss a title dispute
adversary proceeding in In re Crusader Energy Group.179 The
plaintiff filed the adversary proceeding seeking a determination
that certain mineral interests that had been scheduled as property of
the estate by the debtors were instead property of the plaintiff. The
plaintiff sought a broad application of Stern. The defendant argued
that Stern was a narrow ruling that applied to only certain types of
counterclaims and certainly not to a title dispute in which the
defendant was not asserting a counterclaim. In denying the motion
to dismiss, Judge Houser opined from the bench that determining
what is property of the estate is central to the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court via referral from the district court.180 Judge
Houser also ruled that, in the event her ruling on jurisdiction was
incorrect, she would request that the district court review her prior
rulings in the adversary proceeding on summary judgment motions
and accept them as a report and recommendation to the district
court.181 The plaintiff argued that, in a core proceeding for which
there is no constitutional authority for the bankruptcy court to enter
a final judgment, the bankruptcy court can, in fact, do nothing, not
even submit a report and recommendation on the matter to the
district court (citing to Blixseth, discussed in more detail herein).182
The defendant argued that, while a submission of a report and
recommendation to the district court is mandatory in non-core
matters, there is nothing that prohibits the bankruptcy court from
doing so in other matters; thus, the bankruptcy court may submit a
report and recommendation to the district court in a core matter
even if the bankruptcy court does not have constitutional authority
to enter a final judgment.183 Judge Houser agreed with the
defendant and explained that the plaintiff’s position would render
an absurd result, leaving the bankruptcy court with no options, and
federal judges are not supposed to construe statutes in a manner
that yields absurd results.184
In In re Miller, an Ohio bankruptcy court determined that it
would be acting “within the court’s constitutional authority as
analyzed by” Stern by entering a final order over determinations of
whether certain property was property of the estate, or
179. Earthwise Energy, Inc., et al. v. Crusader Energy Group, Inc. (In re
Crusader Energy Group), Case No. 09-31797-bjh-11; Adv. Proc. No. 09-03141bjh (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2011 [Docket No. 134]).
180. Id. at Docket No. 133.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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alternatively, whether such property was exempted under state
law.185
In Tibble v. Wells Fargo Bank (In re Hudson), the Bankruptcy
Court for the Western District of Michigan decided whether Wells
Fargo’s lien in real property was valid where the mortgage
contained an incorrect description of the real property—it
referenced the wrong lot number.186 The court determined that it
had jurisdiction, by reference from the district court, under 28
U.S.C. § 1334, and that the proceeding was core.187 After
determining that any mortgage asserted by Wells Fargo was
avoidable by the trustee under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) and that the
trustee could administer the real property free and clear of any lien
asserted by the bank, the court addressed Stern.188 The court
explained the ruling in Stern but distinguished the case before it on
the basis that:
This adversary proceeding, even though it requires
reviewing, discussing and deciding state law issues, pertains
to the determination of the validity, extent, or priority of the
Bank’s asserted mortgage lien in Lot 5. Regardless of the
state law issues, this adversary proceeding “arises under”
§ 544(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code.189
The court ended with a cautionary note: In the event the court’s
order were to be appealed, and if the district court were to decide
that the bankruptcy court was not constitutionally authorized to
enter a final order, the bankruptcy court’s opinion is to be deemed
a report and recommendation.190
In Mason v. Szerwinski (In re Szerwinski), an Ohio bankruptcy
court determined its “decision [was] within the court’s
constitutional authority under the Supreme Court’s analysis in”
Stern where it dealt with the issues of avoidability of a lien based
upon applicable Ohio property law.191
In Keybank National Association v. Martinez (In re Martinez),
an Ohio bankruptcy court determined that Stern did not limit its
core authority over a state law conversion claim and issues relating
to dischargeability.192 The court simply stated that its “decision is
185. 2011 WL 3741846, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Aug. 24, 2011).
186. 455 B.R. 648 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011).
187. Id. at 650.
188. Id. at 656.
189. Id. at 657 (citing In re Salander Galleries, 453 B.R. 106 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2011)).
190. Id.
191. 2011 WL 2551012, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio June 27, 2011).
192. 2011 WL 2925481, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio July 18, 2011).
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within the court’s constitutional authority as analyzed by” Stern,
and in any event, “the parties have consented to the entry of a final
order by this court.”193
In Dragisic v. Boricich (In re Boricich),194 an Illinois
bankruptcy court considered an adversary proceeding commenced
against a debtor, which asserted the non-dischargeability of a $1.5
million claim on various grounds supporting exception to
discharge relating to larceny, fraud while acting in a fiduciary
capacity, defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, and
embezzlement. Even though applicable Seventh Circuit precedent
pre-Stern had allowed bankruptcy courts to enter a final money
judgment on a state law claim in a non-dischargeability action, in
light of Stern, the court refused to enter judgment as to the amount
of non-dischargeable debt.195 Instead, the court reserved
jurisdiction to entertain a motion to amend the judgment supported
by briefs submitted by the parties discussing whether Stern leaves
such constitutional authority to a bankruptcy judge in this
scenario.196 The court determined that $659,160.85 was not
dischargeable and owed to Dragisic.197
In Gecker v. Flynn (In re Emerald Casino, Inc.),198 an Illinois
bankruptcy court ruled that res judicata did not apply with respect to
certain counterclaims that were intentionally severed because the
claims were previously asserted to be “different.”199 Prior to
reaching that conclusion, the court determined that, under Stern, the
trustee’s claims against the defendants were counterclaims and thus
would likely need to be decided by an Article III judge. However,
even if the trustee’s bankruptcy complaint were wholly
within the scope of the Stern decision, and so removed
from core jurisdiction, it would still affect the extent of the
estate available to pay Emerald’s creditors. Therefore, the
trustee’s complaint would at least be within the “related-to”
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and, as set forth in 28
U.S.C. § 157(c)(1), a bankruptcy judge may propose
findings and conclusions to the district court for that court’s
entry of judgment pursuant to such jurisdiction.200

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id.
2011 WL 2600692, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. June 29, 2011).
Id. at *9.
Id.
Id. at *11.
459 B.R. 298 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011).
Id. at 300.
Id.
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The court also dispensed with the defendant’s argument, based
on Blixseth (discussed herein), that the court could not even hear
the unconstitutional core matter because no provision of § 157
provides for that where such a proceeding is not non-core. The
court explained that:
The argument . . . ignores the remedy flowing from Stern’s
holding that the statute unconstitutionally allows judgments
to be entered by a non-Article III court. . . . [T]he remedy
for this constitutional violation [in Stern] is to remove
counterclaims covered by the decision from core
jurisdiction. . . . As a result, to the extent that the estate’s
claims are not subject to a final judgment by the bankruptcy
court, they are non-core, and fully within the definition of
related-to jurisdiction in § 157(c)(1).201
Further, “[e]ven if the Supreme Court had not already directed a
more reasonable remedy for the constitutional violation it found in
Stern, the perverse effect of the remedy suggested by the
defendants’ argument would require that it be rejected.”202 The
court, accordingly, denied summary judgment on the core but
unconstitutional proceeding, preferring to “leave the entry of
ultimate judgment to the district court.”203
In Stoebner v. PNY Technologies, Inc. (In re Polaroid
Corp.),204 a Minnesota bankruptcy court held it could not enter
final judgment in deciding a trustee’s motion for partial summary
judgment on a breach of contract claim (Count II), which was filed
in an adversary proceeding after corresponding claims were filed
against the debtor in the bankruptcy cases, absent parties’ express
consent. Notwithstanding conflicting statements on the issue of
consent in the bankruptcy context in Stern, the bankruptcy court
explained that:
Absent consent, a presiding bankruptcy judge will have to
suggest a rationale and a possible outcome to the district
court, at some appropriate time—if, that is, the outcome
would be dispositive of Count Two on the present record.
With consent, a bankruptcy judge would direct entry of
judgment here, i.e., by the clerk of the bankruptcy court.205

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at n.1.
Id.
Id. at 301.
451 B.R. 493 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2011).
Id. at 496.
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The court accordingly ordered that the parties file express written
statements as to their consent or non-consent to the entry of final
judgment by a bankruptcy judge on Count II.206 The court was also
critical of treatment in briefing of the issue as one of jurisdiction,
when after Stern, it is adjudicatory authority as between the district
and bankruptcy courts that is at issue; jurisdiction lies in the
district court.207
In Garden v. Central Nebraska Housing Corp. (In re Roberts),
the Nebraska Bankruptcy Court considered an interpleader
complaint filed by the trustee, which requested the reformation of
mistakes in the legal description of property that was sold after the
trustee was granted stay relief, in order to quiet title among the
parties claiming an interest in the property. 208 The court
determined that in this chapter 7 case, where the debtor received a
discharge, the post-discharge fight is between the deed of trust
trustee and two bidders over the validity of the sale and also among
creditors claiming an interest in the proceeds therefrom.209 Because
the court determined that the outcome of the litigation was unlikely
to affect the administration of the bankruptcy estate significantly, it
concluded that the matter did not arise under title 11, or in a case
under title 11, and was not related to a case under title 11 and that
the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to hear it.210 The court
further explained that Stern “made clear that bankruptcy courts
should refrain from impinging upon the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Article III courts by entering judgments on state law claims
involving non-debtor third parties.”211
In Schmidt v. Klein Bank (In re Schmidt),212 the Eighth Circuit
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed and remanded a bankruptcy
court’s ruling that certain replevin actions (which included claims
for breach of promissory note, breach of personal guaranties,
breach of security agreement, and replevin, and which were
asserted against debtors and non-debtor corporations owned by the
debtors) filed by a bank were core, and thus, the bankruptcy court
was not required to mandatorily abstain from hearing them. The
replevin actions had been originally asserted in state court and then
removed to the bankruptcy court where debtor-principals (and
guarantors) of the companies sued had filed their individual
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id. at 498.
Id. at 496–98.
2011 WL 3035268, at *1 (Bankr. D. Neb. July 19, 2011).
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2 (citing Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2594 (2011)).
453 B.R. 346 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2011).
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bankruptcy petitions.213 The panel made this determination based
upon Stern. The bankruptcy court had determined that it was not
required to abstain under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) because the
replevin actions were core under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) (matters
concerning the administration of the estate); (B) (the allowance or
disallowance of claims against the estate); and (O) (other
proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate or
the adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity security holder
relationship).214 The panel believed that Stern compelled reversal
because, even if a matter fits into one of the enumerated examples
of § 157(b)(2), it must also “arise in a bankruptcy case or under
title 11.”215 Thus, even if the replevin actions could fit under an
enumerated category in § 157(b)(2), they were, in essence, only
related to a case under title 11, and thus, not core.216 The court also
noted that “absent extraordinary circumstances, if a principal
wishes to use the Bankruptcy Code to protect the assets of its
corporation, or wants a bankruptcy court to decide causes of action
against the corporation, it needs to file a bankruptcy case on behalf
of the corporation.”217
In In re Fressadi, the Arizona Bankruptcy Court considered a
motion to convert a debtor’s chapter 11 case to chapter 7.218 After
considering the entire record in the case, as well as a number of
adverse judgments entered against the debtor in litigation against
the debtor that had been removed to the bankruptcy court, the court
determined that the debtor’s case had been filed in bad faith and
dismissed it sua sponte.219 The court noted that each of the state
law cases that had been removed to the bankruptcy court would be
remanded because none of them involved the court’s core
jurisdiction.220 The court loosely stated in a parenthetical that the
holding of Stern was that it is “unconstitutional for bankruptcy
courts as Article I courts to adjudicate common and state law
causes of action which are not part of estate’s counterclaim to
creditor claim.”221
In Colony Beach & Tennis Club, Ltd. v. Colony Beach &
Tennis Club Association., Inc. (In re Colony Beach & Tennis Club

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id. at 347.
Id. at 351.
Id.
Id.
Id.
2011 WL 2909375, at *1 (Bankr. D. Ariz. July 15, 2011).
Id. at *2–3.
Id. at n.1.
Id.
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Association, Inc.),222 a Florida district court on appeal considered
whether to remand to state court claims relating to a state law issue
regarding a resort hotel’s obligations to pay for repairs with respect
to common elements of a beach and tennis club association. The
bankruptcy court below considered the claims against a debtor to
be core proceedings because they involved “allowance or
disallowance of claims against the estate” and “other proceedings
affecting . . . the adjustment of the debtor-creditor . . .
relationship.”223 However, because the claims were “purely state
law claims, asserted in state court,” the court determined that they
could not qualify as a core proceeding because, if they did,
“virtually any claim would entitle a bankruptcy court to enter a
final judgment,” which would run afoul of Marathon and Stern.224
As a consequence, the district court reviewed the bankruptcy
court’s findings and conclusions de novo and reversed the
bankruptcy court on many points of error.225
3. On Avoidance Actions
In Miller v. Greenwich Capital Financial Products, Inc. (In re
American Business Financial Services), the Delaware Bankruptcy
Court considered whether it had jurisdiction after Stern over an
adversary proceeding in which the trustee asserted fraudulent
transfer, avoidance, and recovery claims under federal and state
law as well as fiduciary duty claims.226 The court explained that
many of the counts asserted were core and that no parties objected
to the court’s final adjudicatory authority.227 The court then noted
that the decision in Stern “is a ‘narrow one’ which focuses on
whether the action at issue stems from the bankruptcy itself.”228
Here, where the claims arose after the bankruptcy petition was
filed and “relate[d] entirely to matters integral to the bankruptcy
case” and where “[i]f not for the bankruptcy, these claims would
[have] never exist[ed],” the court determined that it had authority
to hear the proceeding.229

222. 456 B.R. 545 (M.D. Fla. 2011).
223. Id. at 551.
224. Id. at 552.
225. Id. at 552, 566.
226. 457 B.R. 314, 319 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011).
227. Id. at 319 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(A), 157(b)(2)(B),
157(b)(2)(E), 157(b)(2)(H), & 157(b)(2)(O)).
228. Id. (citing Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2618 (2011)).
229. Id. at 319–20 (citing In re Salander O’Reilly Galleries, 453 B.R. 106,
117 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Nowhere in . . . Stern does the Supreme Court
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In Springel v. Prosser (In re Innovative Communication
Corp.), in response to a complaint filed in an adversary proceeding
initiated by the trustee for the ICC Debtors—which sought
avoidance of fraudulent conveyances to certain defendant adult
children of an insider of the debtors—the defendants filed a motion
to dismiss the fraudulent conveyance action.230 The defendants
argued that Stern divested the bankruptcy court of jurisdiction to
determine the fraudulent conveyance action because that action
involved private, and not public, rights, and “because only an
Article III Court can adjudicate fraudulent conveyance actions”
after Stern.231 On August 5, 2011, the court denied the motion to
dismiss,232 explaining that the limitation on bankruptcy court
authority over core proceedings is “narrow” and limited to “one
isolated respect” as pronounced by the majority in Stern—to state
law counterclaims, but not to fraudulent conveyances.233
In Meoli v. The Huntington National Bank (In re Teleservices
Group, Inc.),234 the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of
Michigan considered Huntington’s motion requesting that the court
amend a pretrial order so as to eliminate its designation of an
adversary proceeding, over a potentially multi-million dollar
fraudulent transfer judgment, as a matter in which the bankruptcy
court was authorized to enter a final order subject only to appellate
review under Stern.235 The court ruled that it lacked the
constitutional authority to enter such a final judgment.236 In
reaching that conclusion, the judge explained that his confidence in
his capacity to render “final judgments in many, but not all,
matters arising in connection with a bankruptcy proceeding” in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 157 was clearly “misplaced,” as
shown by Stern.237 The judge explained his frustration:
Everyday I am presented with numerous orders that
Congress expects me to either sign as final or forward on
with a report and recommendation. However, prior to
Stern, I did have a standard—28 U.S.C. § 157—to serve as

rule that the bankruptcy court may not rule with respect to state law . . . when
deciding a matter directly and conclusively related to the bankruptcy.”)).
230. No. 08-03004, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 3040 (Bankr. D.V.I. Aug. 5, 2011).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at *9–10.
234. 456 B.R. 318 (Bankr. W. D. Mich. 2011).
235. Id. at 321.
236. Id.
237. Id.
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my guide. But now I am told that that standard is unreliable
when tested against the Constitution itself.238
The court then proceeded to discuss bankruptcy court authority
throughout the history of the United States and finally reached the
following conclusion:
[W]hile Granfinanciera’s historical references to the
recovery of fraudulent conveyances and preferences through
the common law courts offers additional insight, it is not a
necessary component to my decision that any judgment that
will enter against Huntington in this adversary proceeding
must be entered by an Article III judge. Stern, coupled with
the Court’s earlier decision in Murray’s Lessee, is all that is
needed to realize that the taking that Trustee has in mind in
this adversary proceeding requires the oversight of a judicial
officer with the independence that is only guaranteed by life
tenure and salary protection.239
The court did, however, note that it believed it “could still enter
a final judgment against Huntington in this case were Huntington
and Trustee both to consent.”240 In conclusion, the bankruptcy
judge lamented:
Unfortunately, Stern has not only corrected my
misunderstanding [that Section 157 solved the constitutional
questions that plagued Bankruptcy Courts post-Marathon]
but has also raised yet another constitutional problem.241 The
result is that there is no easy solution to what I suspect will

238. Id. at 322.
239. Id. at 338.
240. Id.
241. The court explained in great detail how Murray’s Lessee created
another, yet unaddressed, problem. Id. at 344. Not only did the Court in
Murray’s Lessee, as cited in Stern, explain that “we do not consider congress
can either withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature,
is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty.” Id. at 329,
342, & 344 (quoting Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59
U.S. 272, 284 (1856)). Murray’s Lessee further explained that “nor, on the other
hand, can [Congress] bring under the judicial power a matter which, from its
nature, is not a subject for judicial determination.” Id. at 329. The court was
troubled by the fact that if the district court is given authority over bankruptcyrelated issues that do not require judicial process (i.e., things a trustee could
unilaterally do regarding the debtor’s voluntarily handed-over property), would
it not also, under Murray’s Lessee, be unconstitutional to have an Article III
court handle a non-judicial issue such as a sale of debtor’s property under 11
U.S.C. § 363? See id. at 326.
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be years of uncertainty as the bankruptcy process grinds
on.242
In In re Klug, a Kentucky bankruptcy court dismissed a
plaintiff’s state law fraudulent transfer action against a debtor postdischarge, reasoning that the automatic stay was in place and
prevented such action where the plaintiff did not seek a lift of the
stay and because the chapter 7 trustee, who had not abandoned the
claim, was the only party with standing to assert such claim.243 The
court noted that the defendant contended that the court lacked
authority under Stern over state law in rem claims, without further
analysis. However, the court concluded that the proceeding was
core under § 157(b)(2)(H) without further comment.244
In Samson v. Blixseth (In re Blixseth),245 upon considering a
defendant’s motion for mandatory or permissive abstention and
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine relating to an adversary proceeding to
set aside a marital settlement agreement between a debtor and her
former husband and to recover avoidance actions, a Montana
bankruptcy court considered sua sponte whether it had subject
matter jurisdiction over equitable subordination and fraudulent
transfer and preference claims. The court reasoned that it had core
jurisdiction over equitable subordination and fraudulent transfer
and preference claims by statute but that such “authority may not
be exercised unless it is also constitutional.”246 Under Stern,
“[s]ince bankruptcy courts are neither Article III courts nor
adjuncts thereof, they generally may not hear claims that must be
adjudicated by Article III courts.”247 However,
fraudulent conveyance claims in bankruptcy do not fall
within the public rights exception as they are
“quintessentially suits at common law that more nearly
resemble state law contract claims brought by a bankrupt
corporation to augment the bankruptcy estate than they do
creditors’ hierarchically ordered claims to a pro rata share
of the bankruptcy res.” Since Trustee’s fraudulent
conveyance claim is essentially a common law claim
attempting to augment the estate, does not stem from the
bankruptcy itself[,] and would not be resolved in the claims
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Id. at 326.
No. 10-53071, 2011 WL 3352468 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Aug. 3, 2011).
Id. at *2.
No. 09-60452-7, 2011 WL 3274042 (Bankr. D. Mont. Aug. 1, 2011).
Id. at *10.
Id.
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allowance process, it is a private right that must be
adjudicated by an Article III court. This Court’s jurisdiction
over that claim as a core proceeding is therefore
unconstitutional.248
The court found that equitable subordination and preference
claims, however, were constitutionally within the court’s
jurisdiction because they “arise from the claims allowance
process.”249 The court also explained that “[u]nlike in non-core
proceedings, a bankruptcy court has no statutory authority to
render findings of fact and conclusions of law for core proceedings
that it may not constitutionally hear.”250 Here, the court explained
that “[w]hile 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) allows a bankruptcy judge to
render findings and conclusions in ‘a proceeding that is not a core
proceeding but that is otherwise related to a case under title 11,’ no
other code provision allows bankruptcy judges to do the same in
core proceedings.”251 Therefore, the court concluded that it lacked
statutory authority to hear the fraudulent transfer claims at all, as a
core or a non-core proceeding, and granted the parties 14 days in
which to move the district court to withdraw its reference.252
Otherwise, the bankruptcy court would dismiss the fraudulent
conveyance claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.253
4. On Federal Bankruptcy Issues
In In re Franchi Equipment Co., Inc., a Massachusetts
bankruptcy court considered whether it had jurisdiction to approve
fees of a chapter 7 trustee and his counsel for services rendered in
connection with the termination of an ERISA plan and quoted the
following passage from Stern for an overview of bankruptcy court
jurisdiction:
The manner in which a bankruptcy judge may act on a
referred matter depends on the type of proceeding involved.
Bankruptcy judges may hear and enter final judgments in
“all core proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in a
case under title 11.” “Core proceedings include, but are not
limited to” 16 different types of matters, including
“counterclaims by [a debtor’s] estate against persons filing
248. Id. at *11 (quoting Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 56 (1989);
citing Stern v. Marshall, 131 U.S. 2594, 2618 (2011)).
249. Id.
250. Id. at *12.
251. Id. (emphasis added).
252. Id.
253. Id.
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claims against the estate.” Parties may appeal final
judgments of a bankruptcy court in core proceedings to the
district court, which reviews them under traditional appellate
standards.
When a bankruptcy judge determines that a referred
“proceeding . . . is not a core proceeding but . . . is otherwise
related to a case under title 11,” the judge may only “submit
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the
district court.” It is the district court that enters final
judgment in such cases after reviewing de novo any matter to
which a party objects.254
The court then determined that it had core jurisdiction over the
fee award because Congress conferred the responsibilities at issue
to trustees under Bankruptcy Code § 704(a)(11), and trustees
“literally ‘arise under’ the Bankruptcy Code.”255
In deciding whether mandatory abstention was appropriate, the
District Court for the Southern District of New York said in Little
Rest Twelve, Inc. v. Visan256 that Stern was distinguishable and
inapplicable to the determination of whether certain claims relating
to conversion of ownership interests in the debtors were core (after
being removed to that court from state court and being related to
Florida bankruptcy proceedings) where the claims at issue were
not specifically enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 157: “The Supreme
Court’s decision in [Stern] does not affect this conclusion. Stern
dealt with a counterclaim by a bankruptcy estate against a person
filing a claim against the estate, a category of claim explicitly
identified by statute as core.”257
In In re Bearing Point,258 couching its ruling on a motion
seeking limited relief from a debtor’s confirmation order as either
abstention or as relief from the confirmation order, the Bankruptcy
Court for the Southern District of New York granted the motion
and ruled that the trustee would not be required to litigate retained
causes of action against officers and directors stemming from
certain plan releases in bankruptcy court.259 The court based its
ruling in large part on Stern. After acknowledging (1) that,
previously in the confirmation order, it had “failed to consider how
254. 452 B.R. 352, 356 (2011) (quoting Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594,
2603–04 (2011)) (citations omitted).
255. Id. at 360.
256. 458 B.R. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
257. Id. at 57 n.8.
258. 453 B.R. 486 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).
259. Id. at 490.
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litigants could tie a case up in knots by exploiting their rights to an
Article III judge determination when litigation against them is noncore,” (2) that, after Stern, “it’s fair to assume that it will now be
argued, that consent, no matter how uncoerced and unequivocal,
will never again be sufficient for bankruptcy judges ever to issue
final judgments on non-core matters,” and (3) the potential for
motions seeking withdrawal of the reference to be filed, the
bankruptcy court refused to require the trustee to attempt to litigate
such non-core matters in that court.260
In In re Okwonna-Felix,261 the Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of Texas confronted the issue of whether to
approve a compromise relating to the settlement of a lawsuit
against a company insuring a debtor’s homestead under
Bankruptcy Rule 9019. The court determined that it had
jurisdiction over this core matter under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A),
(B), and (O) and distinguished Stern.262 The court explained that
Rule 9019 “gives bankruptcy courts discretion to approve a
compromise. State law has no equivalent to Bankruptcy Rule
9019.”263 Moreover, the factors a bankruptcy court considers in
determining whether to approve a 9019 settlement “have been
developed entirely by the federal courts, including the Supreme
Court of the United States.”264
Accordingly, because the resolution of the Motion is not
based on state common law, but entirely on federal
bankruptcy law (both the Rule and the case law instructing
how to apply the Rule), the holding in Stern is inapplicable,
and this Court has the constitutional authority to enter a
final order in this contested matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(a) and (b)(1).265
Alternatively, the court explained that the public rights exception,
as discussed in Stern, applies because:
The Bankruptcy Code is a public scheme for restructuring
debtor-creditor relations, necessarily including “the
exercise of exclusive jurisdiction over all of the debtor’s
property, the equitable distribution of that property among
the debtor’s creditors, and the ultimate discharge that gives

260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id. at 489–90.
No. 10-31663, 2011 WL 3421561 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2011).
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the debtor a ‘fresh start’ by releasing him, her, or it from
further liability for old debts.”266
A key issue in this case as to whether to approve the settlement
was whether property of the estate was exempt, which is an issue
established by the Bankruptcy Code and central to the bankruptcy
scheme.267 Accordingly, the court concluded that it was authorized
to enter a final order.268
In Sanders v. Muhs (In re Muhs),269 the Bankruptcy Court for
the Southern District of Texas ruled that a debtor’s debt was nondischargeable under Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(2)(B) because the
debt was obtained by use of a written statement that was materially
false as to his financial condition, and the creditor reasonably
relied on that statement, which the debtor made with the intent to
deceive.270 Before reaching that conclusion, however, the court
examined its authority under Stern.271 The court noted that after
Stern, a bankruptcy court’s “authority over matters involving statelaw causes of action is particularly questionable.”272 However, the
court concluded that it “may exercise authority over essential
bankruptcy matters under the ‘public rights’ exception” under the
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co. statement of
that exception, which maintains that “a right closely integrated into
a public regulatory scheme may be resolved by a non-Article III
tribunal.”273
The Bankruptcy Code is a public scheme for restructuring
debtor-creditor relations, necessarily including “the
exercise of exclusive jurisdiction over all of the debtor’s
property, the equitable distribution of that property among
the debtor’s creditors, and the ultimate discharge that gives

266. Id. at *5 (quoting Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 363–64
(2006); citing N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,
71 (1982); and contrasting Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2614 n.7 (2011)
(“We noted [in Granfinanciera] that we did not mean to ‘suggest that the
restructuring of debtor-creditor relations is in fact a public right.’”)).
267. In re Okwanna-Felix, 2011 WL 3421561, at *5.
268. Id.
269. No. 09-10564, 2011 WL 3421546 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2011).
270. Id. at *6–7.
271. Id. at *1.
272. Id.
273. Id. (citing Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568,
593 (1985)).

692

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

the debtor a ‘fresh start’ by releasing him, her, or it from
further liability for old debts.”274
Further, there are two overlapping classes of claims that still fall
within the bankruptcy court’s authority post-Stern: “(1) matters
invoking the Court’s in rem jurisdiction over the estate and (2)
disputes over rights created by the Bankruptcy Code as an integral
part of the public bankruptcy scheme.”275 Here, where the dispute
arose over the debtor’s right to a discharge and any amounts
excepted therefrom, and a discharge is established by the
Bankruptcy Code and central to the bankruptcy scheme, the court
retained authority to determine the dispute.276
In Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz (In re Ritz),277
the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas considered
whether a debtor was liable for non-dischargeable debts relating to
the transfer of assets away from a corporation that could not pay its
creditors because it was insolvent.278 The court concluded that the
plaintiff failed to establish the liability of the individual debtor for
the debts of the corporation and thus that there was no debt to
discharge.279 As to the court’s authority, the court explained that
the dispute was core under § 157(b)(2)(A), (I), and (O).280 The
court noted that Stern limited the pool of matters previously
subject to bankruptcy court authority and explained that the
broader applicability of Stern “remains unclear.”281 The court
determined, as it did in In re Muhs, however, that it had authority
under Thomas’ “public rights” exception.282 Here, where the
dispute was over the debtor’s discharge, the right to a discharge is
central to the public bankruptcy scheme and is established by the
Bankruptcy Code.283 The bankruptcy court also “has the authority
274. Id. (quoting Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 363–64
(2006); citing N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,
72 (1982); and contrasting Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2614 n.7 (2011)
(“We noted [in Granfinanciera] that we did not mean to ‘suggest that the
restructuring of debtor-creditor relations is in fact a public right.’”)).
275. Id. at *2.
276. Id.
277. 459 B.R. 623 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011).
278. Id. at 626.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 630–31.
281. Id. at 631.
282. Id. (citing Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 363–64 (2006);
N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 72 (1982); but
see Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2614 n.7 (2011) (“We noted [in
Granfinanciera] that we did not mean to ‘suggest that the restructuring of
debtor-creditor relations is in fact a public right.’”)).
283. Id. at 631.
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to determine when the statutorily established right to a discharge
does not apply. . . . Such determinations are inextricably tied to the
bankruptcy scheme and involve adjudication of rights created by
the Bankruptcy Code.”284 Thus, the court determined that it had
core adjudicatory authority to enter a final judgment.285
In In re Bigler, LP,286 the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of Texas ruled that it could enter a final order on a dispute
involving lien priority over assets that were once property of the
estate.287 The court reasoned that such a suit fits within the “public
rights” exception because “it involves the exercise of the
Bankruptcy Court’s in rem jurisdiction over the estate.”288 The
court further explained, as it had in In re Muhs and In re Ritz, that
it had authority to enter final orders on matters that fall within the
“public rights” exception.289 The court noted: “In simpler terms if a
bankruptcy court can enter a final judgment on anything, it would
be a final order resolving a dispute as to who gets a slice of the pie
and how big that slice is.”290 Where the dispute arose from an
express provision of the Plan, the court concluded that the dispute
also “involve[d] a right created by the Bankruptcy Code—
distribution of property of the estate to creditors pursuant to the
Plan.”291
In In re Jordan River Resources, Inc.,292 a Michigan
bankruptcy court had before it a liquidating trust’s objection to
certain preferred interests asserted by an insider party. 293 The court
considered whether based on those asserted interests the interest
holder was entitled to share in distributions under a confirmed
plan.294 The court, citing to Stern, concluded that it could “enter
final judgment because the controversy involve[d] claims to a res
within the court’s jurisdiction (permissibly resolved by a
bankruptcy judge) rather than a proceeding to augment the estate
(presumptively within the purview of a life-tenured district judge
284. Id. at 632.
285. Id.
286. 458 B.R. 345 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011).
287. Id. at 369.
288. Id.
289. Id. (citing Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 363–64 (2006))
(emphasis omitted). However, the court did note that the Supreme Court in
Stern stated that “we did not mean to suggest that the restructuring of debtorcreditor relations is in fact a public right.” Id. (quoting Stern v. Marshall, 131 S.
Ct. 2594, 2614 n.7 (2011)).
290. Id. at 370 n.24.
291. Id. at 371.
292. 455 B.R. 657 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011).
293. Id. at 660.
294. Id.
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with salary protections under Article III of the U.S.
Constitution).”295 “The court can enter final judgment in this
matter, subject to appellate review under 28 U.S.C. § 158, because
resolving the Plaintiff’s objection to [the] Preferred Interests
‘stems from the bankruptcy itself or would necessarily be resolved
in the claims allowance process.’”296
In In re Ramsey,297 an Ohio bankruptcy court determined that
its “decision [was] within [that] court’s constitutional authority as
analyzed by” Stern, with respect to a creditor’s motion to lift a stay
to litigate its claims against the debtor based on state law
(including breach of contract and fraud), which were filed in state
court over a year pre-petition, and concluded that it would be
judicially efficient for the state court to continue its hearings on
those claims.298
In Palazzola v. City of Toledo (In re Palazzola),299 an Ohio
Bankruptcy Court determined that a count in a complaint asserting
a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of rights by one
acting under color of law did not arise under title 11, was not
“related to” a case under title 11, and would have no effect on the
administration of the estate, thus, the court lacked jurisdiction over
the § 1983 claim. The plaintiff argued that the claim arose out of
the bankruptcy case because “the substantive right created by
§ 524 of the Bankruptcy Code, that is, the right to be free from
collection attempts on discharged debts by a creditor postdischarge, the claim is at least arguably a proceeding ‘arising in’
their case under title 11 and, thus, a core proceeding.”300 The court
explained, however, that in Stern, the Supreme Court “ma[de] clear
that the statutory authority under § 157 alone is insufficient to
confer subject matter jurisdiction where the exercise of such
jurisdiction would be in contravention of Article III of the United
States Constitution”301 and that the § 1983 action was a personal
injury tort claim and, thus, was “a suit at common law.”302
Accordingly, the court dismissed the § 1983 claim for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.303

295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
2011).
300.
301.
302.
303.

Id. (citing Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2601 (2011)).
Id. (citing Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2601).
No. 10-16609, 2011 WL 2680575 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio July 7, 2011).
Id. at *1–2.
No. 09-37696, 2011 WL 3667624, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Aug. 22,
Id. (citing Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2605).
Id. at *4.
Id. at *6.
Id.
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The Chief Judge of the Nebraska Bankruptcy Court entered
three opinions dealing with Stern, which all arose out of the same
bankruptcy case: In re AFY, Inc. They will be discussed here as
AFY I,304 AFY II,305 and AFY III.306
In AFY I, the court considered whether to dismiss an adversary
proceeding for lack of jurisdiction under Stern and phrased the
Stern holding this way:
the Supreme Court determined that while the bankruptcy
court had statutory authority under 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(b)(2)(C) to enter final judgment on a counterclaim, it
lacked the constitutional authority to do so on a state law
counterclaim that is not resolved in the process of ruling on
a creditor’s proof of claim.307
The court also noted that Stern’s holding was narrow and that
Congress had exceeded its constitutional authority “only in ‘one
isolated respect.’”308 Here,
This adversary proceeding was filed to identify and force
the turnover of certain property alleged to be property of
the debtor’s bankruptcy estate, which constitutes a core
proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(E). Further the
trustee’s right to bring a turnover proceeding is created by
Title 11. 11 U.S.C. § 542. This court is not deprived of
subject matter jurisdiction simply because resolution of the
lawsuit may require the application of state law.309
In AFY II, the same court ruled, where the trustee sought
payment of a $4.5 million receivable and argued that it was entitled
to turnover under 11 U.S.C. § 542, that, unlike AFY I, the
proceeding was not core.310 Here, the court phrased the Stern
holding in a more broad fashion: “[t]he Stern decision
circumscribes the ability of non-Article III judges to enter final
judgments on certain types of claims, limiting the bankruptcy
304. Badami v. Sears (In re AFY, Inc.), No. BK10-40875-TLS, 2011 WL
3812598 (Bankr. D. Neb. Aug. 18, 2011) [hereinafter AFY I].
305. Badami v. Ainsworth Feed Yards, LLC (In re AFY, Inc.), No. BK1040875-TLS, 2011 WL 3800120 (Bankr. D. Neb. Aug. 18, 2011) [hereinafter
AFY II].
306. Badami v. Sears Cattle Co. (In re AFY, Inc.), No. BK10-40875-TLS,
2011 WL 3800041 (Bankr. D. Neb. Aug. 18, 2011) [hereinafter AFY III].
307. AFY I, at *1 (citing Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011)).
308. Id.
309. Id. (citing In re Salander O’Reilly Galleries, No. 07-30005, 2011 WL
2837494, at *10–13 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2011)).
310. AFY II, at *2.
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court’s constitutional authority to do so to core proceedings
stemming from the bankruptcy itself and actions that ‘would
necessarily be resolved in the claims allowance process.’”311 The
court determined that the proceeding to recover the $4.5 million
receivable was not subject to turnover in § 542 because under
§ 542(b), turnover actions apply to debts that are “matured,
payable on demand, or payable on order.”312 Here, where the
money sought was not clearly a receivable it was “beyond the
scope of § 542” and was an action that “normally, would, be
adjudicated outside of bankruptcy.”313 Thus, the court determined
that the action did not arise under Title 11, did not arise in the
bankruptcy case, and would not be resolved in the claims
allowance process, and therefore that the bankruptcy court was not
the appropriate forum for the trial.314 The bankruptcy court
accordingly vacated its prior summary judgment on the matter,
granted defendant’s motion for relief from judgment, and
recommended that the district court withdraw the reference.315
Similarly to AFY II, the court in AFY III analyzed Stern broadly
and ruled that it should grant defendant’s motion for relief from
prior judgment on trustee’s claim for collection of an account
receivable of just under $300,000, because Stern prevented it from
entering a final order on a collection action, even though the action
fell within the ambit of Bankruptcy Code § 542 as a turnover
action.316 The court reasoned that “[w]hile [the action] falls within
the scope of § 542(b), it nevertheless is simply a collection action . . .
[that] normally would[] be adjudicated outside of bankruptcy.”317
The court accordingly granted defendant’s motion for relief from
judgment, vacated its prior judgment in relevant part, and
recommended withdrawal of the reference to the district court.318
Unlike AFY II, the court here requested that the district court
consider its prior order on the matter as proposed findings and
conclusions to be adopted, entering judgment for the plaintiff.319
In Musich v. Graham (In re Graham),320 a Colorado
bankruptcy court considered the issue of non-dischargeability of
certain debts of a debtor under Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(6). Upon
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
AFY III, at *1–2.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at *3.
455 B.R. 227 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2011).
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concluding that the debt was nondischargeable, the court addressed
Stern in a footnote. The court explained that Stern
may put into doubt this Court’s ability and authority to rule
on this issue because it emanates from an interpretation of
Colorado civil tort law and criminal law. The alleged
tortious conduct—the assault and wrongful acts under state
law—have been fully adjudicated by the state court. This
Bankruptcy Court is dealing only with the question of
dischargeability. Moreover, the matter at hand is agreed to
by the parties to be a “core” proceeding under 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(b)(2)(A) and (I) and this matter indeed appears to be
a ‘core’ proceeding—statutorily and constitutionally—thus,
this Court believes it can issue this ruling accordingly.321
In FNB Bank v. Carlton (In re Carlton), an Alabama
bankruptcy court determined that an adversary complaint filed by a
bank seeking a declaration that it was not prohibited from postconfirmation foreclosure, and counterclaims asserted by the debtor
asserting a violation of the confirmation order and claims under the
Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), were all “core” proceedings.322
The court reached the conclusion that each of these matters was
core because (1) the parties agreed that the adversary complaint
and the confirmation-order-violation counterclaim were each core
and (2) the TILA counterclaim
Involve[d] the allowance of the Bank’s claims—or more
accurately, the reconsideration of their allowance pursuant
to § 502(j). If the Debtor is entitled to recover on her TILA
claims, then the Bank’s allowed claims will be subject to
set-off via reconsideration under § 502(j). Allowance, and
likewise reconsideration of allowance, are core proceedings
under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B).323
The court noted, however, the following in a footnote:
The Court is confident of its conclusion that adjudication of
the TILA claims are within its core jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 157(b)(2). However, the Bank did not challenge
this Bankruptcy Court’s jurisdiction based on an argument
that a non-Article III judge does not have subject matter
jurisdiction to hear the TILA claims asserted in the
counterclaim. Nonetheless, because an adjudication of the
321. Id. at n.27.
322. No. 10–40388–JJR–13, 2011 WL 3799885 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Aug. 26,
2011).
323. Id. at *1.
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TILA claims would be the basis for a reconsideration of
allowance of the Bank’s claims via setoff, it appears this
non-Article III judge does in fact have the necessary
subject matter jurisdiction to enter a final order on the
TILA claims.324
In In re Safety Harbor Resort and Spa325 a Florida bankruptcy
court held that Stern did not prevent it from imposing “lock-up”
restrictions on the debtors’ business and non-debtor guarantors as
part of plan confirmation because plan confirmation is a “core”
proceeding.326 The court noted that “the few cases that have
considered whether confirmation is a core proceeding have
universally agreed that it is.”327 Here,
the lock-up provisions are an integral part of the order
confirming the plan under which the non-debtor guarantors
will receive the benefit of an injunction protecting them
from being sued on their guarantees during the term of the
plan. Unquestionably, the Court’s consideration of such
terms falls within this Court’s core jurisdiction under
section 157(b)(2)(L).328
The court reached that conclusion over the debtor’s objection
based on Stern, noting that “[t]he debtor reads Stern too
broadly.”329 The court stated the holding of Stern as follows:
The Supreme Court merely held that Congress exceeded its
authority under the Constitution in one isolated instance by
granting bankruptcy courts jurisdiction to enter final
judgments on counterclaims that are not necessarily resolved
in the process of ruling on a creditor’s proof of claim.
Nothing in Stern limits a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over
other “core” proceedings. Nor does the Stern Court’s
reliance on its earlier decision in Granfinanciera somehow
impose some new limitation on this Court’s jurisdiction that
has not existed since that case was decided over twenty years
ago. Besides, parties can still consent—either expressly or
impliedly—to a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction after
Stern.330
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

Id. at n.5 (citing Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011)).
456 B.R. 703 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011).
Id. at 719.
Id. at 716.
Id. at 719.
Id. at 705.
Id.
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Before reaching that conclusion, the court engaged in a
thorough description of the analysis set forth in Stern.331 In
determining that the holding in Stern was narrow, the court
explained that “[i]n fact, the Supreme Court’s holding does not
even remove all state-law counterclaims from the bankruptcy
court’s jurisdiction”332 and stated that “nothing in the Supreme
Court’s opinion actually limits a bankruptcy court’s authority to
adjudicate the other ‘core proceedings’ identified in section
157(b)(2).”333 Interestingly, the court noted that,
It is understandable that some would view that language [in
Stern that an issue must stem from the bankruptcy itself or
be resolved in the claims allowance process in order to be
“core”] as a new limit on the Court’s constitutional
authority to finally resolve other “core” proceedings, such
as fraudulent conveyance or preference actions. But the
Stern Court’s use of the word “reaffirm” makes clear that
nothing has changed. The sole issue in Granfinanciera was
whether the Seventh Amendment conferred on petitioners a
right to a jury trial in the face of Congress’ decision to
allow a non-Article III tribunal to adjudicate the claims
against them. Granfinanciera did not hold that bankruptcy
courts lack jurisdiction to enter final judgments on
fraudulent conveyance claims. In fact, the Supreme Court
went to great lengths to emphasize that the issue was not
even before it in that case. . . . And the language from
Granfinanciera that some courts and commentators fear
may limit bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction—language relied
on by the Stern court—has been the law for over twenty
years. Yet, this Court is not aware of a single case during
the twenty years preceding Stern challenging a bankruptcy
court’s authority to enter final judgments in fraudulent
conveyance actions.334
Finally, the court explained that:
Of course, years from now, the Supreme Court may hold
that section 157(b)(2)(F) dealing with fraudulent
conveyances is unconstitutional, just as it did with section
157(b)(2)(C). But the job of bankruptcy courts is to apply
the law as it is written and interpreted today. Bankruptcy
courts should not invalidate a Congressional statute, such
331.
332.
333.
334.

See id. at 707–19.
Id. at 715.
Id.
Id. at 717 (citations omitted).
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as section 157(b)(2)(F)—or otherwise limit its authority to
finally resolve other core proceedings—simply because
dicta in Stern suggests the Supreme Court may do the same
down the road. The Supreme Court does not ordinarily
decide important questions of law by cursory dicta. And it
certainly did not do so in Stern.335
5. On Jurisdictional Determinations
In The Fairchild Liquidating Trust v. State of New York and the
New York State Department of Transportation (In re The Fairchild
Corporation),336 the Delaware Bankruptcy Court had before it,
inter alia, the issue of whether adversary proceedings asserting
claims for breach of contract and various forms of takings with
respect to certain property should be dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction based upon sovereign immunity and noted that
Stern was “inapplicable” because
the issue in Stern v. Marshall was when, under the United
States Constitution, the bankruptcy court could enter a final
judgment as opposed to proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law in a case where subject matter
jurisdiction existed under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a). As such,
Stern v. Marshall is not a case about subject matter
jurisdiction. Rather, it addresses the power of the
bankruptcy court to enter final orders, assuming that
subject matter jurisdiction exists.337
The court’s power to enter a final order was not implicated, and
thus, Stern did not apply.338
In an opinion ruling a bankruptcy court’s remand of a state-law
removed action non-appealable, the Seventh Circuit in Townsquare
Media, Inc. v. Brill339 briefly addressed the issue of whether
supplemental jurisdiction would expand a bankruptcy court’s
jurisdiction, and, without deciding whether supplemental
jurisdiction would apply in a bankruptcy context, the court
explained that supplemental jurisdiction would be “inconsistent
with the statutory treatment of ‘related to’ jurisdiction (and why
should supplemental jurisdiction be broader?) and is in tension
335. Id. at 718 (citations omitted).
336. 452 B.R. 525 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011).
337. Id. at n.14 (citations omitted).
338. Id.
339. 652 F.3d 767 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing, inter alia, Stern v. Marshall, 131 S.
Ct. 2594 (2011)).
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with the Supreme Court’s reluctance to allow bankruptcy judges
dispositive authority over state-law claims. But that’s another issue
we need not resolve.”
The Seventh Circuit in Matrix IV, Inc. v. American National
Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago considered whether RICO and
common law fraud claims were subject to res judicata and/or
collateral estoppel.340 The district court ruled that the claims were
subject to both res judicata and collateral estoppel because the
exact claims had been litigated and lost in the bankruptcy
proceedings.341 The circuit court affirmed, though on narrower
grounds, because:
the res judicata argument exposes some tension in our
caselaw and a lopsided circuit split on how claim
preclusion applies in this context. The Supreme Court’s
recent decision [in Stern] suggests that resolving the
conflict may be a bit more complicated than the caselaw
presently admits. Because collateral estoppel—issue
preclusion—blocks this new suit in its entirety, we affirm
on this narrower ground of decision and leave the
resolution of the conflict for a future case in which it will
actually matter.342
The doctrine of “res judicata bars not only those issues actually
decided in the prior suit, but all other issues which could have been
brought,” while collateral estoppel is narrower as it bars relitigation of an issue that was actually litigated previously. 343 The
court reached its conclusion because of conflicting case law on the
subject, including its own precedent, which held that RICO claims,
which are non-core, are not barred by res judicata as to core claims
that are already resolved, as compared against the precedent in
“every other circuit” that has rejected the core/non-core distinction
for purposes of res judicata.344
The Idaho Bankruptcy Court in In re Clark cited Stern for the
proposition that 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) “is not ‘jurisdictional’ but
instead addresses where such claims shall be tried.”345

340. 649 F.3d 539 (7th Cir. 2011).
341. Id. at 546.
342. Id. at 542.
343. Id. at 547.
344. Id. at 551.
345. No. 10–20466–TLM, 2011 WL 3294040, at n.16 (Bankr. D. Idaho July
29, 2011).
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6. Minor Citations to Stern
In Correia v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (In re
Correia), the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit
determined that a debtor lacked standing to challenge the
assignment of a mortgage to the bank because the Debtor was not a
party to the relevant assignment documents.346 The court expressly
declined to “reach the question whether the bankruptcy court’s
jurisdiction was properly invoked to adjudicate the state law anent
the foreclosure sale’s validity” and explained that “[h]ere we can
easily resolve the matter on the merits, without considering
whether the bankruptcy court’s exercise of jurisdiction was
constitutional.”347
In In re Taylor, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals cited Stern
for the proposition that a bankruptcy court’s factual findings are
reviewed for clear error.348
In a qui tam action relating to a patent marking violation, a
Pennsylvania district court in Hollander v. Ranbaxy Laboratories,
Inc. cited Stern for the proposition that “[s]eparation-of-powers
principles are intended, in part, to protect each branch of
government from incursion by the others.”349
A Pennsylvania bankruptcy court in Schatz v. Chase Home
Finance (In re Schatz) also cited Stern for the three types of
jurisdiction and quoted Stern for the proposition that “[b]ankruptcy
judges may hear and enter final judgments on ‘all core proceedings
arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title 11.’” 350 In
Schatz the court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
certain causes of action that subsequently re-vested in the debtor,
which were not within the “arising under,” “arising in,” or “related
to” jurisdiction because they were not property of the estate after
the re-vesting.351
A Virginia bankruptcy court in In re Loy cited Stern for the
proposition that “[p]arties may appeal final judgments of a

346. 452 B.R. 319 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2011).
347. Id. at n.3 (citing Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011); U.S. v.
Vilches-Navarrete, 523 F.3d 1, 9 n.6 (1st Cir. 2008) (“The maxim that courts
should not decide constitutional issues when this can be avoided is as old as the
Rocky Mountains and embedded in our legal culture for about as long.”)).
348. 655 F.3d 274, 282–83 (3d Cir. 2011).
349. No. 10–793, 2011 WL 2787151 (E.D. Pa. July 18, 2011).
350. 452 B.R. 544, 551 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2011).
351. Id. at 552.
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bankruptcy court in core proceedings to the district court, which
reviews them under traditional appellate standards.”352
In Kemp v. Segue Distrib., Inc. (In re Kemp), a Louisiana
bankruptcy court cited Stern for the proposition that there are
“three types of bankruptcy jurisdiction: ‘arising under,’ ‘arising
in,’ and ‘related to’ jurisdiction.”353 The court determined that it
did not have jurisdiction in any of those forms over the issue of
whether judicial estoppel bars a personal injury action brought by
debtors, which arose three years after plan confirmation.354
In an order on an omnibus claims objection in In re Pilgrim’s
Pride Corp., the Northern District of Texas Bankruptcy Court
stated in a footnote that:
The U.S. Supreme Court recently suggested in dicta that
this court might try a personal injury claim by consent,
including implied consent of the claimant. See Stern v.
Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). However, under the
order of reference to this court, personal injury claims are
not referred, and thus, implied consent is not possible.355
In denying the government’s request for a new trial on wire
fraud charges because the government “forfeited its ability to now
seek retrial based upon its failure to timely assert the claim that the
jury had not completed its work by returning the verdicts it did,” a
Florida district court in United States v. Cabrera356 reasoned that
“there would be no reason to allow the government to prevail if it
had believed the jury was about to be discharged without
completing all of its required functions yet remained silent.” The
court cited Stern for the proposition that “sandbagging, i.e.,
‘remaining silent about his objection and belatedly raising the error
only if the case does not conclude in his favor’ may result in the
forfeiture of even constitutional rights.”357

352. Nos. 07–51040–FJS, 09–51379–FJS, 2011 WL 2619253, at * 5 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. July 1, 2011).
353. No. 03–52422, 2011 WL 3664497, at *4 (Bankr. W.D. La. Aug. 19,
2011).
354. Id. at *6.
355. No. 08–45664(DML), 2011 WL 3799835, at n.16 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
Aug. 26, 2011) (citation omitted).
356. No. 2:08–cr–94–FtM–99DNF, 2011 WL 2681248 (M.D. Fla. July 11,
2011).
357. Id. at *5 (citing Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2608 (2011)).
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C. Consent Analysis
28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) allows a bankruptcy court to enter a final
order on non-core matters with the consent of the parties:
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of this
subsection [dealing with related-to jurisdiction], the district
court, with the consent of all the parties to the proceeding,
may refer a proceeding related to a case under title 11 to a
bankruptcy judge to hear and determine and to enter
appropriate orders and judgments, subject to review under
section 158 of this title.358
The Supreme Court explained in Stern that, although Pierce
consented to the bankruptcy court’s adjudication of his defamation
proof of claim,359 Pierce did not consent to the adjudication of
Vickie’s counterclaim, i.e., the tortious interference claim.360 Thus,
a bankruptcy court’s ability to hear and determine matters related
to a title 11 case with the consent of all parties, such as the tortious
interference counterclaim, should be undisturbed after Stern.
Indeed, many courts applying Stern have expressed the opinion
that parties may still consent to a bankruptcy court’s
finaladjudicatory authority over “related to” matters after Stern
under 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2).361
358. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) (emphasis added).
359. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2606.
360. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2607. When confronted with the question of
whether Pierce consented to the resolution of Vickie’s counterclaim in the
bankruptcy court, the Court in Stern explained that
Pierce did not have another forum in which to pursue his claim to
recover from Vickie’s pre-bankruptcy assets, rather than take his
chances with whatever funds might remain after the Title 11
proceedings . . . . [A]s we recognized in Granfinanciera, the notion of
“consent” does not apply in bankruptcy proceedings as it might in
other contexts.
Id. at 2614–15, n.8 (emphasis added). Exactly what is meant by the Court’s
statement that the notion of consent is different in the bankruptcy context is
unclear; however, earlier in the opinion, the Court cited to 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2)
for the proposition that parties may consent to a bankruptcy court’s adjudication,
so this isolated statement does not appear to undermine that consent statute.
361. See, e.g., In re Safety Harbor Resort and Spa, 456 B.R. 703 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 2011) (parties can still consent—either expressly or impliedly—to a
bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction after Stern); In re Olde Prairie Block Owner,
LLC, 2011 WL 3792406, at *1 (Bankr. N. D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2011) (bankruptcy
court can enter a final order on counterclaims asserted by the debtor (whether or
not they were otherwise resolvable in the claims adjudication process) based
upon consent of the parties); Stoebner v. PNY Technologies, Inc. (In re Polaroid
Corp.), 451 B.R. 493 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2011) (court refused to enter final
judgment on state law action in adversary proceeding absent consent); Jones v.
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Yet, some courts are not convinced. In Bearing Point,
discussed above, Judge Gerber wrote that the Supreme Court found
Pierce’s consent inadequate for the bankruptcy judge to determine
the counterclaim, and he further opined that, now, consent may
never be sufficient for a bankruptcy judge to issue final judgments
on non-core matters.362 But, Judge Gerber appears to have
overlooked that the consent to which the Supreme Court referred
concerned Pierce’s defamation claim, not Vickie’s tortious
interference claim. Indeed, there is no suggestion in the opinion
that the Supreme Court would have ruled the same way had Pierce
expressly consented to the bankruptcy court’s entry of a final order
on the tortious interference claim. The constitutionality of 28
U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) was not at issue in Stern, and, in fact, the
Supreme Court cited to § 157(c)(2) with approval regarding the
bankruptcy court’s determination of the defamation claim.363
Moreover, the constitutionality of the analogous consent statute in
the magistrate context (28 U.S.C. § 636(c)) has passed
constitutional muster in several circuits.364 Until the Supreme
Court affirmatively holds that 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) is
unconstitutional, bankruptcy judges should comfortably preside
over matters related to a title 11 case if the parties consent.

Mandel (In re Mandel), 2011 WL 2728415, at *3 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. July 12,
2011) (bankruptcy court did not have constitutional authority to decide a
counterclaim in the absence of parties’ express consent); NYU Hosps. Ctr. v.
HRH Consr. LLC (In re HRH Constr. LLC), No. 09–23665(RDD), 2011 WL
3359576, at *6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2011) (bankruptcy court can enter a
final order on state breach of contract action with consent of the parties); Meoli
v. The Huntington Nat’l Bank (In re Teleservices Group, Inc.), 456 B.R. 318
(Bankr. W. D. Mich. 2011) (bankruptcy court would have authority to enter a
final order in a fraudulent transfer adversary proceeding if the parties consent);
Keybank Nat’l Ass’n v. Martinez (In re Martinez), 2011 WL 2925481, at *1
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio July 18, 2011) (bankruptcy court can enter final order on
state law conversion claim and dischargeability issues with parties’ consent).
362. See In re Bearing Point, Inc., 453 B.R. 486, 496–97 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2011).
363. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2607.
364. See, e.g., Puryear v. Ede’s Ltd., 731 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1984); Collins
v. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1984); Goldstein v. Kelleher, 728 F.2d 32
(1st Cir. 1984); Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc.,
725 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc); Wharton-Thomas v. U.S., 721 F.2d 922
(3d Cir. 1983). A more thorough discussion of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) and the
similarities with § 157(c)(2) appears near the conclusion of this article.
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D. Rerouting and Increasing Court Traffic
The ruling will surely increase traffic on district court dockets
while also increasing bankruptcy courts’ workloads due to
increased motions for permissive abstention under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334(c)(1) and by creditors and motions for withdrawal of
reference under 28 U.S.C. § 157(d). The ruling might also cause
district courts to withdraw bankruptcy court reference more
frequently on their own accord, in an effort to streamline the
courts’ efforts where possible. Bankruptcy courts may also still
likely hear state-law claim issues, but they will submit proposed
findings and conclusions to the district court subject to de novo
review instead of issuing final orders on them. This means two
judges will effectively have to decide the factual and legal issues
instead of one. State courts may also become busier—in order to
avoid the conflict/confusion, parties may choose to litigate “civil
proceedings arising under title 11 or arising on or related to cases
under title 11” in a more piecemeal fashion by going to state court
in the first instance because 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) jurisdiction is
original, but non-exclusive.365 In addition to the published opinions
discussed supra, the following are further examples.
In In re Extended Stay, Inc.,366 plaintiffs, as trustee for and on
behalf of the Extended Stay Litigation Trust, moved to withdraw
the reference under 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) to the district court on both
mandatory and permissive grounds, in light of Stern as well as
Second Circuit jurisprudence limiting post-confirmation
jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts. The lawsuits at issue were filed
by the trustee on behalf of the creditors of Extended Stay, Inc.
relating to a “disastrous” leveraged buyout, siphoning of funds
from the debtors to the tune of approximately $2.1 billion to
Blackstone and over $100 million in improper dividends and
distributions to post-buyout equity holders and their affiliates.367
By the time of this motion, the debtors’ plan had long been
confirmed (July 20, 2010), had become effective (October 8,
2010), and had been substantially consummated.368 The trustee
argued in favor of mandatory withdrawal of the reference,
notwithstanding the court’s retention of jurisdiction over arising in,
arising under, and related to matters, explaining that the
365. Note, however, that “the district courts shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction of all cases under title 11.” 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a).
366. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Withdraw
the Reference, Case No. 09-13764 (JMP), Adv. Pro. No. 11-2255 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2011) [Docket No. 19].
367. Id. at 2.
368. Id. at 4.
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bankruptcy court’s ability to enter final judgments on lawsuits
initiated against third parties post-confirmation is constitutionally
unsettled because of Stern.369 Here, the trustee stated that the
bankruptcy court has, at best, “related to” jurisdiction over the nonbankruptcy state and federal law claims in the adversary
proceeding.370 Citing Bearing Point, the trustee pointed out that
administrative and procedural delays and hurdles will obtain if the
court retains adjudicatory authority over a non-core issue.371 Even
though some of the claims in the adversary proceeding are
admittedly core (seeking avoidance and recovery of fraudulent
transfers under the Bankruptcy Code), they are asserted along with
state law claims as well.372 The trustee also argued for permissive
withdrawal of reference “for cause,” citing Bearing Point, and in
order to promote judicial efficiency, to prevent delay and cost to
the parties, and to avoid forum shopping, and because the plan has
already been confirmed and the court’s jurisdiction was
lessened.373 As of August 2, 2011, the case was referred to the
District Court for the Southern District of New York, and on
November 15, 2011, the district court denied the motion for
withdrawal of the reference.374
E. Basis of “Core” Determination
28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(3) also appears to be undermined by Stern:
The bankruptcy judge shall determine, on the judge’s own
motion or on timely motion of a party, whether a
proceeding is a core proceeding under this subsection or is
a proceeding that is otherwise related to a case under title
11. A determination that a proceeding is not a core
proceeding shall not be made solely on the basis that its
resolution may be affected by State law.375

369. Id. at 5.
370. Id. at 8.
371. Id. at 10 (citing In re Bearing Point, Inc., 453 B.R. 486 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2011)).
372. Id. at 10–11.
373. Id. at 11.
374. Walker, Truesdell, Roth & Assoc. v. The Blackstone Group (In re
Extended Stay, Inc.), Case No. 11-cv-5394 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2011) [Docket
No. 17].
375. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(3).
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F. Settlements and Compromises
Parties may seek approval of more settlements and
compromises under Rule 9019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure in an effort to short-circuit protracted piecemeal
resolution of issues in bankruptcy cases.
G. Filing Proofs of Claim
The Stern opinion reminds us that parties filing proofs of claim
should think carefully about whether to file them if jurisdictionchallenging counterclaims could be asserted, considering the
potential additional expense and delay of resolving such
counterclaims. Even before Stern, it was well settled that the
bankruptcy court can hear and determine avoidance actions filed
against a party who files a proof of claim.376 Though it has long
been questionable whether some avoidance actions fall within the
bankruptcy court’s core jurisdiction,377 the filing of a proof of
claim tethers the avoidance action to the bankruptcy court’s core
jurisdiction by way of 11 U.S.C. § 502(d).
H. Bankruptcy Appellate Panels
If a single bankruptcy judge lacks the authority to enter certain
types of final judgments, then the authority of a gathering of three
bankruptcy judges would be subject to the same constitutional
infirmity for the same types of matters.
I. Certification
In Stern, the Supreme Court appeared bothered by the fact that
the bankruptcy court granted Vickie a huge award ($425 million)
based on a determination of “whether Texas recognized a cause of
action for tortious interference with an inter vivos gift—something
the Supreme Court of Texas had yet to do.”378 Certification of the
issue to the Texas Supreme Court for guidance on an unsettled
issue in Texas law before awarding such a huge sum of money to
Vickie in a very high profile case might have been helpful.
Certification is a somewhat extraordinary way to obtain an
advisory opinion from a state supreme court on an issue of
376. Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
377. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
378. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2610 (2011) (citing In re Marshall,
275 B.R. 5, 50–51 (C.D. Cal. 2002)).
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unsettled law, though the existence and parameters of such
certification vary by state. In Texas, unfortunately, neither the
bankruptcy court nor the district court would have been entitled to
certify the question, but the Ninth Circuit grappling with the Stern
case could have. The Texas Supreme Court allows certification,
but only from federal courts of appeals.379 Also of interest, the
New York Court of Appeals similarly allows certification from the
U.S. Supreme Court, a federal court of appeals, or a court of last
resort of another state.380
J. Are Magistrate Judges Subject to the Same Problems?
Like the bankruptcy judge, the magistrate judge derives
jurisdiction and authority by Congressional statute.381 Magistrate
judges are not Article III judges. 28 U.S.C. § 631(e) provides that
the term of a full-time magistrate judge is eight years, and his or
her salary is the same as a bankruptcy judge. The purpose of the
magistrate judge is to relieve district judges of certain judicial
responsibilities that can be separated from their exclusive
constitutional duties in order to reduce case loads.382 To further
this goal, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), which allows
the magistrate judge to conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or
nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case.
Under § 636(c)(4), the district court may, for good cause shown on
its own motion, or under extraordinary circumstances shown by
any party, vacate a reference of a civil matter to a magistrate judge
under the consent statute.
The bankruptcy consent statute in 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) and
the magistrate consent statute in 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) are
arguably so similar that any pronouncements on the
constitutionality of one statute should apply by analogy to the
other.383 Indeed, the constitutionality of § 636(c)(1) has been
379. See TEX. CONST. art. 5, § 3-C (“The supreme court and the court of
criminal appeals have jurisdiction to answer questions of state law certified from
a federal appellate court.”).
380. See N. Y. CONST. art. VI, § 3(b), cl. 9.
381. Magistrate judges derive their authority from 28 U.S.C. § 636. There is
no such thing as a “magistrate court.” The court in which a magistrate judge sits
is the district court. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 151 (a “bankruptcy court” is a unit of the
district court).
382. U.S. v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 93 (4th Cir. 1984).
383. See Olde Prairie Block Owner, LLC, 457 B.R. 692, 701 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 2011) (“If Stern had destroyed the power of Bankruptcy Judges to enter final
judgments by consent in non-core but otherwise related proceedings, that would
have called into question the power of Magistrate Judges . . . to make final
adjudication by consent . . . .”).
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challenged on the grounds that a magistrate judge cannot
constitutionally enter judgments in civil cases even with the
parties’ consent because a magistrate judge is not an Article III
judge. Yet, several circuits have held that § 636(c)(1) passes
constitutional muster.384 In Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic v.
Instromedix, Inc., the Ninth Circuit, en banc, noted that the
constitutional question to be addressed vis-à-vis Congress’s
enactment of the consent statute is separation of powers. The Ninth
Circuit observed that the “standard for determining whether there
is an improper interference with or delegation of the independent
power of a branch is whether the alteration prevents or
substantially impairs performance by the branch of its essential
role in the constitutional system.”385 The circuit court ultimately
held that § 636(c)(1) contains “sufficient protection against the
erosion of judicial power to overcome the constitutional objections
leveled against it.”386 The court concluded that the Article III
courts control the magistrate system as a whole.387 The selection of
magistrates and their retention in office is the responsibility of
Article III judges.388 Moreover, the Article III judge can cancel an
order of reference. These factors led the Ninth Circuit to conclude
that the reference of civil cases to magistrate judges with the
consent of parties, subject to careful supervision by Article III
judges, may serve to strengthen an independent judiciary, not
undermine it.389
The Article III oversight of magistrate judges discussed in
Pacemaker is also present with respect to bankruptcy judges.390
Thus, if 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) is ever challenged on the
constitutional ground of separation of powers, Pacemaker should
provide persuasive authority to argue that § 157(c)(2) is
constitutional. If Stern is construed as concluding that parties
cannot consent to the bankruptcy court hearing and determining
non-core, related to matters, including the tortious interference
counterclaim in Stern, then the many cases holding that the
384. See, e.g., Puryear v. Ede’s Ltd., 731 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1984); Collins
v. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1984); Goldstein v. Kelleher, 728 F.2d 32
(1st Cir. 1984); Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc.,
725 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc); Wharton-Thomas v. U.S., 721 F.2d 922
(3d Cir. 1983).
385. Pacemaker, 725 F.2d at 544 (citing Nixon v. Admin. of General Servs.,
433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)).
386. Id.
387. Id. at 545.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 546.
390. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 151, 152, 154(b), and 157(a), (b)(2)(B), (b)(5),
(c)(1), and (d).
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magistrate consent statute passes constitutional muster would also
be undermined. In Bearing Point, Judge Gerber indeed read Stern
broadly to opine that 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) may be
unconstitutional.391 But Stern does not address the constitutionality
of the statute; instead, Stern mentions it with approval with regard
to Pierce’s consent to the bankruptcy court’s adjudication of his
defamation claim. The holding in Stern should not be extrapolated
to speak to the constitutionality of a statute not at issue in that case.
While the Supreme Court has not had occasion to specifically
address whether either 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) or 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c)(1) are constitutional, the Supreme Court in Roell v.
Withrow held that consent under § 636(c)(1) can be implied from a
party’s conduct during litigation.392 It strains logic to argue that the
Supreme Court would hold that § 636(c)(1) is unconstitutional in
light of Roell. In fact, Justice Thomas, writing for the dissent,
raised constitutional concerns of the majority’s holding in Roell
but only because such consent, he wrote, should be express.393 In
other words, even the dissent in Roell supports the notion that a
party may consent to have a non-Article III judge decide a civil
matter. Thus, any constitutional concerns raised by post-Stern
cases (or commentators), such as Bearing Point, should be
ameliorated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Roell, and the
great weight of circuit court authority upholding the
constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
IV. CONCLUSION
Does Stern v. Marshall shake the foundation of bankruptcy
courts? Maybe, maybe not. In the relatively short time between the
issuance of Stern and the date of the writing of this article, over 50
bankruptcy opinions have discussed the case, and articles abound
on the subject. These opinions and articles have established a wide
continuum on the subject, and many have observed that it is not yet
clear what the full ramifications of Stern will be. However, what is
certain after Stern is that a bankruptcy judge may not enter final
orders on state law counterclaims that are not otherwise resolved in
the claims resolution process. Additionally, as a number of postStern courts have held, Stern may even stretch by analogy to stand
for the more general proposition that a bankruptcy court cannot
enter judgment without the consent of parties on matters that are in
substance only “related to” a title 11 case, even if such matters are
391. See In re Bearing Point, Inc., 435 B.R. 486, 496–97 (2011).
392. 538 U.S. 580, 582 (2003).
393. See id. at 596–97 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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listed in the core proceeding list under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2).
Moreover, there is language in Stern (and Granfinanciera)
touching on the fundamental issue of the constitutional authority of
bankruptcy courts that may prove useful to future litigants who
attempt to use Stern to shake the foundation of bankruptcy courts.
Until that time, however, it ought to be business as usual in the
bankruptcy courts.
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APPENDIX B
Subject

Circuit

Decision
Date

Case/Comment

Holding
Type

Counterclaims

5th

July 11, 2011

Turner v. First Cmty. Credit
Union (In re Turner), 462
B.R. 214 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
2011)—bankruptcy court
retains authority over
counterclaim not based on
state law under “public
rights” exception.

Narrow

Counterclaims

5th

July 12, 2011

Jones v. Mandel (In re
Mandel), 2011 WL 2728415
(Bankr. E.D. Tex. July 12,
2011)—bankruptcy court
cannot decide restitution
counterclaim absent consent.

Expansive

Counterclaims

7th

Aug. 25, 2011

In re Olde Prairie Block
Owner, LLC, 457 B.R. 692
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011)—
bankruptcy court has the
authority to enter a final order
on counterclaims asserted by
the debtor either (1) where the
parties consented or (2) where
the counterclaims were
resolved in the process of
adjudicating the claims.

Narrow

Counterclaims

9th

July 15, 2011

Siegel v. FDIC (In re
Indymac Bankcorp., Inc.),
2011 WL 2883012 (C.D. Cal.
July 15, 2011)—district court
refused to withdraw reference
of non-core counterclaim
under Stern.

Narrow

2012]
Subject

BANKRUPTCY COURTS AFTER STERN
Circuit

Decision
Date

Case/Comment

715
Holding
Type

State Law Issues

1st

Aug. 5, 2011

United Systems Access
Telecom, Inc. v. N. New
England Telephone
Operations, LLC, 456 B.R.
148 (D. Me. 2011)—
withdrawing reference on
§ 157(d) grounds based upon
applicability of FCC
regulation without reaching
Stern issue as to whether state
law applied.

Cautionary

State Law Issues

2nd

Aug. 2, 2011

NYU Hospitals Ctr. v. HRH
Constr., LLC (In re HRH
Constr., LLC), 2011 WL
3359576, at *6 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2011)—
bankruptcy court adjudicated
on a final basis state breach of
contract claim removed to the
district court and referred to
the bankruptcy court on
express consent of the parties.

Narrow

State Law Issues

2nd

July 18, 2011

In re Salander O’Reilly
Galleries, 453 B.R. 106
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011)—
retained determination over
property of the estate
determination
notwithstanding contrary
choice of law (international)/
arbitration provision.

Narrow

State Law Issues

3rd

Aug. 15, 2011

Buffets Holdings, Inc. v. Cal.
Franchise Tax Board, 455
B.R. 94 (Bankr. D. Del.
2011)—issues of validity of
claims and allowance of
claims are core issues, and
bankruptcy court can enter
final order.

Narrow

716

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Subject

Circuit

Decision
Date

Case/Comment

[Vol. 72
Holding
Type

State Law Issues

3rd

Aug. 25, 2011

In re The Salem Baptist
Church of Jenkintown, 455
B.R. 857, n.6 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 2011)—noted that Stern
extends to common law
causes of action and that
bankruptcy courts may not
decide a common law cause
of action when the action
neither derives from nor
depends on any agency
regulatory regime.

Expansive

State Law Issues

3rd

June 28, 2011

Barnhart v. Demarco (In re
Demarco), 454 B.R. 343
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2011)—
Stern prevents bankruptcy
court from hearing non-core
actions removed to the
bankruptcy court (here, there
were no assets in estate for
distribution).

Expansive

State Law Issues

3rd

July 22, 2011

Fed. Ins. Co. v. DBSI (In re
DBSI, Inc.), 2011 WL
3022177 (Bankr. D. Del. July
22, 2011) - declining to enter
order on issue of D&O
insurance coverage until
parties briefed Stern’s impact
on the issue.

Cautionary

State Law Issues

4th

July 5, 2011

Cline v. Quicken Loans, 2011
WL 2633085 (N.D.W. Va.
July 5, 2011)—applied
mandatory abstention where
comity and judicial economy
did not support retaining state
law causes of action removed
to district court, even though
related proof of claim was
filed, explaining that the
proof of claim did not convert
the claims into a core
proceeding.

Expansive
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Holding
Type

State Law Issues

5th

Aug. 16, 2011

Sigillito v. Hollander (In re
Hollander), 2011 WL
3629479 (5th Cir. Aug. 16,
2011)—remanded case to the
bankruptcy court for decision
on whether debtor’s
representations constituted
fraud under state law and left
to the district court the issue
of whether Stern had any
applicability.

Cautionary

State Law Issues

5th

July 25, 2011

So. La. Ethanol, LLC v.
Whitney Nat’l Bank (In re
So. La. Ethanol, LLC), 438
Fed. Appx. 274 (Bankr. E.D.
La. 2011)—with respect to
ruling on MSJ regarding
validity of lien, court gave
caveat that to the extent it
lacked jurisdiction, the
opinion was to be deemed a
report and recommendation.

Cautionary

State Law Issues

5th

Aug. 19, 2011

Rogers v. The CIT
Group/Equipment Financing,
Inc. (In re B.C. Rogers
Poultry, Inc.), 455 B.R. 524
(Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2011)—
because the Fifth Circuit has
not yet ruled on the reach of
Stern, the Court entered a
final order on various state
law contract and tort claims
of a debtor in an adversary
proceeding.

Narrow

State Law Issues

5th

July 11, 2011

Christian v. Soo Bin Kim (In
re Soo Bin Kim), 2011 WL
2708985 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
July 11, 2011)—denial of
motion to dismiss probaterelated action under Stern.

Narrow
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State Law Issues

5th

July 22, 2011

In re Crescent Resources,
LLC, 457 B.R. 506 (Bankr.
W.D. Tex. 2011)—Stern is
not applicable to state-law
privilege issues regarding
motion to compel turnover of
documents.

Narrow

State Law Issues

5th

Aug. 25, 2011

In re Crusader Energy Group,
Adv. Pro. No. 09-03141
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. Aug. 25,
2011) [Docket Nos. 133,
134]— Stern is not applicable
to property of the estate
determinations.

Narrow

State Law Issues

6th

Aug. 24, 2011

In re Miller – 2011 WL
3741846, at *1 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio Aug. 24, 2011)—
bankruptcy court can enter a
final order over property of
the estate determinations.

Narrow

State Law Issues

6th

Aug. 16, 2011

Tibble v. Wells Fargo Bank
(In re Hudson), 455 B.R. 648
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011)—
lien avoidance is a core issue
regarding which bankruptcy
court can enter a final order.

Narrow

State Law Issues

6th

June 27, 2011

Mason v. Szerwinski (In re
Szerwinski), 2011 WL
2551012, at * 1-2 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio June 27, 2011)—
bankruptcy court can resolve
issues of avoidability of a lien
based upon state law.

Narrow

State Law Issues

6th

July 18, 2011

Keybank Nat’l Ass’n v.
Martinez (In re Martinez),
2011 WL 2925481, at *1
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio July 18,
2011)—Stern does not limit
bankruptcy court’s core
authority over state law
conversion claim and issues
relating to dischargeability.

Narrow
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Type

State Law Issues

7th

June 29, 2011

Dragisic v. Boricich (In re
Boricich), 2011 WL 2600692
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. June 29,
2011)—reserved for further
consideration issue of
whether bankruptcy court
could enter money judgment
on state law claim in nondischargeability action.

Cautionary

State Law Issues

7th

Aug. 26, 2011

Gecker v. Flynn (In re
Emerald Casino, Inc.), 459
B.R. 298 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
2011)—Stern’s taking of state
law counterclaims out of
bankruptcy courts’ core
authority means only that a
bankruptcy judge may
propose findings and
conclusions on such matters;
it does not mean, as espoused
in Blixseth, that the
bankruptcy court cannot hear
such matters at all.

Narrow

State Law Issues

8th

July 7, 2011

Stoebner v. PNY Techs., Inc.
(In re Polaroid Corp.), 451
B.R. 493 (Bankr. D. Minn.
2011)—absent consent, a
bankruptcy court cannot enter
final judgment on state law
breach of contract action in
adversary proceeding.

Expansive

State Law Issues

8th

July 19, 2011

Garden v. Cent. Neb. Housing
Corp. (In re Roberts), 2011
WL 3035268 (Bankr. D. Neb.
July 19, 2011)—Stern stands
for proposition that
bankruptcy courts should not
enter judgments on state law
claims involving third parties.

Expansive
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State Law Issues

8th

Aug. 3, 2011

Schmidt v. Klein Bank (In re
Schmidt), 453 B.R. 346 (8th
Cir. B.A.P. Aug. 3, 2011)—
bankruptcy court cannot enter
final order on actions that
might fit within a category
listed in § 157(b)(2) where it
is in essence only related-to
(re: actions against debtorowned non-debtor
companies).

Expansive

State Law Issues

9th

July 15, 2011

In re Fressadi, 2011 WL
2909375 (Bankr. D. Ariz.
July 15, 2011)—Stern
requires remand of state court
actions removed to
bankruptcy court where
chapter 7 case dismissed for
bad faith filing.

Expansive

State Law Issues

11th

July 27, 2011

Colony Beach & Tennis Club,
Ltd. v. Colony Beach &
Tennis Club Ass’n, Inc. (In re
Colony Beach & Tennis Club
Ass’n, Inc.), 456 B.R. 545
(M.D. Fla. 2011)—purely
state law claims cannot be
“core” under Stern.

Expansive

Avoidance
Actions

3rd

July 28, 2011

Miller v. Greenwich Capital
Fin. Prods., Inc. (In re Am.
Bus. Fin. Servs.), 457 B.R.
314 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011)—
Stern is inapplicable to the
resolution of state and federal
avoidance actions.

Narrow
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Holding
Type

Avoidance
Actions

3rd

July 6, 2011

Springel v. Prosser (In re
Innovative Communication
Corp.), No. 08-03004, 2011
Bankr. LEXIS 3040 (Bankr.
D. U.S.V.I. Aug. 5, 2011)—
Stern is not applicable to
fraudulent conveyance
determination.

Narrow

Avoidance
Actions

6th

Aug. 17, 2011

Meoli v. The Huntington
Nat’l Bank (In re
Teleservices Group, Inc.),
456 B.R. 318 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 2011)—bankruptcy
court authority is vastly
undermined by Stern, and
Court cannot enter final order
in potentially multi-million
dollar fraudulent transfer
adversary proceeding.

Expansive

Avoidance
Actions

6th

Aug. 3, 2011

In re Klug, 2011 WL
3352468 (Bankr. E.D. Ky.
Aug. 3, 2011)—denying state
law fraudulent transfer claims
asserted post-discharge
because trustee was only
party with standing to pursue
and finding the proceeding
core under § 157(b)(2)(H).

Narrow

Avoidance
Actions

9th

Aug. 1, 2011

Samson v. Blixseth (In re
Blixseth), 2011 WL 3274042
(Bankr. D. Mont. Aug. 1,
2011)—After Stern,
bankruptcy court cannot even
hear, much less enter report
and recommendation on,
unconstitutional “core”
matters, including fraudulent
transfer actions (which are
“quintessentially suits at
common law”).

Expansive
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Type

Federal
Bankruptcy
Issues

2nd

June 29, 2011

In re Franchi Equipment Co.,
Inc., 452 B.R. 352 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 2011)—bankruptcy
court has core jurisdiction
over chapter 7 trustee fee
award because trustees “arise
under” the Bankruptcy Code.

Narrow

Federal
Bankruptcy
Issues

2nd

July 20, 2011

Little Rest Twelve, Inc. v.
Visan, 458 B.R. 44 (S.D.N.Y.
2011)—Stern inapplicable to
determination of whether
certain claims relating to
conversion of ownership
interests were core where the
claims at issue were not
specifically enumerated in
§ 157.

Narrow

Federal
Bankruptcy
Issues

2nd

July 11, 2011

In re Bearing Point, 453 B.R.
486 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2011)—modifying
confirmation order to allow
trustee to pursue non-core
D&O actions in nonbankruptcy court forum based
on Stern.

Expansive

Federal
Bankruptcy
Issues

5th

Aug. 3, 2011

In re Okwonna-Felix, 2011
WL 3421561 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. Aug. 3, 2011)—
bankruptcy court retains final
authority over 9019
compromise under “public
rights” exception.

Narrow

Federal
Bankruptcy
Issues

5th

Aug. 2, 2011

Sanders v. Muhs (In re
Muhs), 2011 WL 3421546
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. Aug. 2,
2011)—bankruptcy court
retains final authority over
discharge (a central
bankruptcy matter) under
“public rights” exception.

Narrow
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Holding
Type

Federal
Bankruptcy
Issues

5th

Aug. 4, 2011

Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v.
Ritz (In re Ritz), 459 B.R.
623 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
2011)—bankruptcy court
retains final authority over
dischargeability under “public
rights” exception.

Narrow

Federal
Bankruptcy
Issues

5th

Aug. 19, 2011

In re Bigler, L.P., 458 B.R.
345 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011)
—bankruptcy court retains
final authority over lien
priority and distribution of
property of the estate issues
under “public rights”
exception.

Narrow

Federal
Bankruptcy
Issues

6th

Aug. 16, 2011

In re Jordan River Res., Inc.,
455 B.R. 657 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 2011)—bankruptcy
court can enter final order on
determination of whether a
preferred interest holder was
entitled to distributions.

Narrow

Federal
Bankruptcy
Issues

6th

July 7, 2011

In re Ramsey, WL 2680575,
at *1–2 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
July 7, 2011)—bankruptcy
court retains final authority
over creditor’s motion to lift
stay against debtor to litigate
state law claims in state court,
which were filed prepetition.

Narrow
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Federal
Bankruptcy
Issues

6th

Aug. 22, 2011

Palazzola v. City of Toledo
(In re Palazzola), 2011 WL
3667624, at *4 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio. Aug. 22, 2011)—§ 157
is insufficient to confer
subject matter jurisdiction to
bankruptcy courts where it
would be unconstitutional to
do so, and a § 1983 action is a
personal injury tort claim, and
thus, a suit at common law,
not a core proceeding, despite
the applicability of a debtor’s
right to be free from
collection attempts on
discharged debts under § 524.

Expansive

Federal
Bankruptcy
Issues

8th

Aug. 18, 2011

Badami v. Sears (In re AFY,
Inc.) (“AFY I”), 2011 WL
3812598 (Bankr. D. Neb.
Aug. 18, 2011)—bankruptcy
court retains final
adjudicatory authority over
turnover action, even if court
must apply state law.

Narrow

Federal
Bankruptcy
Issues

8th

Aug. 18, 2011

Badami v. Ainsworth Feed
Yards, LLC (In re AFY, Inc.)
(“AFY II”), 2011 WL
3800120 (Bankr. D. Neb.
Aug. 18, 2011)—bankruptcy
court does not retain final
adjudicatory authority over
turnover action where
property is not “matured,
payable on demand, or
payable on order” and thus
falls outside the ambit of
§ 542 and where it is really a
collection action.

Expansive
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Holding
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Federal
Bankruptcy
Issues

8th

Aug. 18, 2011

Badami v. Sears Cattle Co.
(In re AFY, Inc.) (“AFY
III”), 2011 WL 3800041
(Bankr. D. Neb. Aug. 18,
2011)—bankruptcy court
does not retain final
adjudicatory authority over
turnover action even where
action falls within the ambit
of § 542 where it is really a
collection action.

Expansive

Federal
Bankruptcy
Issues

10th

July 11, 2011

Musich v. Graham (In re
Graham), 455 B.R. 227
(Bankr. D. Colo. July 11,
2011)—bankruptcy court
retains final authority over
dischargeability as “core”
proceeding.

Narrow

Federal
Bankruptcy
Issues

11th

Aug. 26, 2011

FNB Bank v. Carlton (In re
Carlton), 2011 WL 3799885
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. Aug. 26,
2011)—counterclaims
asserting a violation of a
confirmation order and Truth
in Lending Act violations
(which tie to reconsideration
of the bank’s claims’
allowance under § 502(j)) are
“core” and subject to final
order of the bankruptcy court.

Narrow

Federal
Bankruptcy
Issues

11th

Aug. 30, 2011

In re Safety Harbor Resort
and Spa, 456 B.R. 703
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011);
2011 WL 3841599 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2011)—
Stern does not prevent
bankruptcy court from
entering final order on plan
confirmation dispute as a
“core” proceeding.

Narrow
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Jurisdiction
Determinations

3rd

July 29, 2011

The Fairchild Liquidating
Trust v. State of N.Y. and the
N.Y. State Dep’t of Transp.
(In re The Fairchild Corp.),
452 B.R. 525 (Bankr. D. Del.
2011)—Stern not applicable
to issue of alleged lack of
subject matter jurisdiction due
to sovereign immunity.

Narrow

Jurisdiction
Determinations

7th

July 21, 2011

Townsquare Media, Inc. v.
Brill, 652 F.3d 767 (7th Cir.
2011)—supplemental
jurisdiction of bankruptcy
courts, if it even exists, would
be inconsistent with Stern.

Expansive

Jurisdiction
Determinations

7th

July 28, 2011

Matrix IV, Inc. v. Am. Nat’l
Bank and Trust Co. of
Chicago, 649 F.3d 539 (7th
Cir. 2011)—Stern may
impact whether the core/noncore distinction is relevant to
the applicability of res
judicata.

Cautionary

Jurisdiction
Determinations

9th

July 29, 2011

In re Clark, 2011 WL
3294040 (Bankr. D. Idaho
July 29, 2011)—§ 157(b)(5)
is not jurisdictional; rather it
only allocates authority.

Narrow

Minor Citations
to Stern

1st

June 30, 2011

Correia v. Deutsche Bank
Nat’l Trust Co. (In re
Correia), 452 B.R. 319
(B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2011)—
refusing to reach the issue of
whether bankruptcy court had
authority over state law
foreclosure validity dispute
after Stern.
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Minor Citations
to Stern

3rd

Aug. 24, 2011

In re Taylor, 655 F.3d 274
(3d Cir. 2011)—citing Stern
for the proposition that a
bankruptcy court’s factual
findings are reviewed for
clear error.

Citation

Minor Citations
to Stern

3rd

July 18, 2011

Hollander v. Ranbaxy
Laboratories, Inc., 2011 WL
2787151 (E.D. Pa. July 18,
2011)—citing Stern for the
proposition that separation of
powers principles are
intended, in part, to protect
each branch of government
from incursion by the others.

Citation

Minor Citations
to Stern

3rd

July 25, 2011

Schatz v. Chase Home
Finance (In re Schatz), 452
B.R. 544 (Bankr. M.D. Pa.
2011)—citing Stern for its
description of “arising
under,” “arising in,” and
“related to” jurisdiction.

Citation

Minor Citations
to Stern

4th

July 1, 2011

In re Loy, 2011 WL 2619253,
at * 5 (Bankr. E.D. Va. July
1, 2011)—citing Stern for
proposition that district court
reviews bankruptcy court
final orders under traditional
appellate standards.

Citation

Minor Citations
to Stern

5th

Aug. 19, 2011

Kemp v. Segue Distrib., Inc.
(In re Kemp), 2011 WL
3664497, at *4 (Bankr. W.D.
La. Aug. 19, 2011)—citing
Stern for its description of
“arising under,” “arising in,”
and “related to” jurisdiction.

Citation
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5th

Aug. 26, 2011

In re Pilgrim’s Pride, Corp.,
2011 WL 3799835 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2011)—
rejecting Supreme Court’s
suggestion in Stern that a
bankruptcy court might try a
personal injury claim by
consent.

Citation

Minor Citations
to Stern

11th

July 11, 2011

United States v. Cabrera,
2011 WL 2681248 (M.D. Fla.
July 11, 2011)—citing Stern
for the proposition that if a
party remains silent about an
objection, he may forfeit even
constitutional rights.

Citation

